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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Courts of Israel and the United States treat cases 
involving national security radically differently, or so it appears on the 
surface. The Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, 
often hears cases in real time while the cannons are proverbially booming,
1
 
whereas the United States Supreme Court typically hears cases, if at all, 
long after the actual event. The Israeli Supreme Court utilizes highly 
relaxed rules of standing in cases challenging unlawful governmental 
conduct, whereas the United States Supreme Court applies increasingly 
restrictive rules of standing, which sometimes permit unlawful 
governmental practices to go unchallenged. The Israeli Supreme Court 
summarily rejects the political question doctrine and treats challenges to 
the legality of military conduct as justiciable, whereas the United States 
Supreme Court typically declines to hear cases involving ongoing military 
actions. Additionally, the Israeli Supreme Court rarely utilizes a state 
secrets privilege, whereas the United States Supreme Court embraces the 
doctrine, which often immunizes illegal governmental action. The fact that 
the two courts make very different use of these justiciability doctrines 
dramatically affects their willingness to decide “war on terrorism” cases 
that challenge aspects of national security programs as violative of 
individual rights.  
On the surface, the approaches of the two courts thus appear to be 
radically different, and indeed they are, at least with respect to their 
willingness to hear and decide cases in “real time” and in terms of their 
willingness to embrace and apply justiciability doctrines to cases involving 
national security. However, a more probing analysis of actual decisions 
and their impact on coordinate branches of government reveals surprising 
similarities. Despite major rhetorical differences, both courts uniformly 
employ a rule of reasonableness when it comes to second-guessing 
decisions of the military or decisions of the executive branch involving 
national security; both courts steadfastly exhibit considerable deference to 
coordinate branches of government and, with rare exceptions, both courts 
carefully craft decisions designed to maintain the status quo, particularly 
in times of real or perceived crisis. Despite profound differences in 
 
 
 1. The Israeli Supreme Court explicitly rejects the maxim “when the cannons roar, the muses 
are silent.” Rather, according to Justice Barak, “It is when the cannons roar that we especially need the 
laws.” HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel (PCATI) [Dec. 11, 2005] 
slip op. ¶ 61 (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/007/A34/02007690.A34 
.pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss1/3
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threshold justiciability issues, and despite significant differences in 
articulated philosophies of the judicial role, the divide between the two 
courts lessens substantially when it comes to analyzing actual decisions. 
But a real and important difference remains—the greater willingness of the 
Israeli courts to assert the power of judicial review, even in cases 
involving ongoing military action. This power serves as an indispensable 
check on the natural tendency of the political branches to overreact to real 
or perceived threats to national security and jettison long-valued civil 
liberties. The availability of judicial review in Israel sets its Supreme 
Court apart from its US counterpart in ways that ultimately help define the 
character of the nation. 
This Article compares the United States and Israeli Supreme Courts’ 
very different use of justiciability doctrines and then moves beyond those 
doctrines to explore the impact of actual decisions on policies undertaken 
in the name of national security. Part II describes the articulated 
philosophies of the two courts regarding the role of judicial review in 
cases involving national security. This part explores three justiciability 
doctrines—the political question doctrine, standing requirements, and the 
state secrets privilege—and compares the two courts’ declared positions 
with respect to those doctrines in cases dealing with foreign affairs. It also 
analyzes the two courts’ articulated philosophies regarding the scope of 
judicial review in cases implicating military decisions. Part III of the 
article moves away from the courts’ rhetorical stances on questions of 
justiciability and judicial review and examines and compares decisions of 
the two courts in cases that pit national security against individual 
liberties. This part looks at cases challenging practices including targeted 
killings, torture, administrative detention, and other actions undertaken in 
the name of national security. Part IV concludes that (a) the two courts 
have the institutional capability to resolve challenges to national security 
policies; (b) adherence to non-justiciability doctrines like the political 
question doctrine amounts to an abdication of the judicial role; and (c) the 
availability of judicial review has an actual effect on governmental policy 
and military practice. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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II. RHETORICAL PHILOSOPHIES OF THE SUPREME COURTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES AND ISRAEL REGARDING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NATIONAL 
SECURITY CASES  
A. The Political Question Doctrine 
The political question doctrine is a doctrine of non-justiciability, 
whereby the courts refuse to hear a case on the ground that it represents a 
political question that is not appropriate for judicial review. It is a 
judicially created rule of self-restraint whereby the court declines to hear a 
case over which it possesses jurisdiction.
2
 The doctrine represents a 
judgment by the Court that the political branches are better situated to 
resolve these issues. 
The most explicit attempt by the United States Supreme Court to define 
what qualifies as a political question is found in Baker v. Carr: 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political 
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a 
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial 
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or 
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of 
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made; or the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question.
3
 
While this may be the Court’s clearest definition, it raises more questions 
than it resolves.
4
 While it purports to create categories of political 
questions, each category is problematic. For example, the first category 
includes cases raising an issue that has been committed by the Constitution 
to another branch of government. But deciding whether an issue has been 
 
 
 2. The political question doctrine is but one of many self-imposed rules of restraint signifying 
the court’s understanding of its non-democratic character. Other such prudential doctrines are some 
aspects of standing (rules against third party standing, citizen standing, and taxpayer standing), and 
ripeness and mootness doctrines. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Not surprisingly, the doctrine has been described as an enigma with commentators 
disagreeing “about its wisdom and validity” and its “scope and rationale.” Martin Redish, Judicial 
Review and the ‘Political Question,’ 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (1985). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss1/3
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textually committed to a political branch itself requires constitutional 
interpretation.
5
 The second category—cases lacking judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards—is equally problematic, because 
the Court often agrees to hear cases that arguably require technical 
expertise.
6
 The remaining categories of political questions all share a 
common theme—avoiding the merits where there is a particular need for 
the country to speak in one voice, for example, in cases involving foreign 
affairs, or even more specifically, national security.
7
 But the Court has 
 
 
 5. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519 (1969) is a notable example. The case arose when 
Adam Clayton Powell challenged the House of Representatives’ decision not to seat him. Id. at 492–
93. The question before the Supreme Court was whether his claim presented a nonjusticiable political 
question because Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution provides that “each House shall be the Judge 
of the . . . Qualifications of its own members.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 5. On its face, that provision 
seemingly entrusts the issue to the House. However, the Court interpreted the phrase as limited by 
Article I, Section 2, which sets forth the qualifications of members of the House regarding age, 
citizenship, and residence. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 548. Since the House’s decision not to seat Powell 
was based on alleged financial irregularities, and not on the basis of age, citizenship or residence, the 
Court found that the decision was not committed by the Constitution to Congress and was thus not a 
political question. In fact, the Court has rarely found an issue to be textually committed to another 
branch. The one issue that has been found to be entrusted to Congress is a claim under the Guaranty 
Clause, which has been found to preclude judicial review. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849). A 
striking example of the Court seemingly ignoring the political question doctrine is Bush v. Gore, 531 
U.S. 98 (2000), where an argument certainly could have been made that the Constitution entrusts the 
issue to Congress. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Leaving the Decision to Congress, in THE VOTE: BUSH, 
GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 38, 39 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001); 
Laurence Tribe, Comment, EROG v. HSUB and its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from its Hall of 
Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 178, 276–83 (2001); Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The 
Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 
273–300 (2002). 
 6. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973), highlights the problem. Parents of students killed in 
the Kent State tragedy brought a lawsuit alleging grossly inadequate training of the National Guard, 
which led to the death of the students. The Court dismissed the action because it posed a political 
question—a question beyond the Court’s competence to resolve. The Court stated: “[Review] would 
plainly and explicitly require a judicial evaluation of a wide range of possibly dissimilar procedures 
and policies approved by different law enforcement agencies or authorities . . . [i]t would be 
inappropriate for a district judge to undertake this responsibility in the unlikely event that he possessed 
the requisite technical competence to do so.” Id. at 8. Additionally, the Court held that the case would 
likely require the court’s ongoing monitoring and supervision, which, pursuant to the political question 
doctrine, constitutes an unwarranted intrusion into the workings of the political branches. This result is 
hard to square with a multitude of cases involving the court in ongoing supervision, such as prison 
conditions cases and school desegregation cases. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); 
Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (providing examples of prison conditions). 
 7. “[It] would have been unthinkable for the Supreme Court to intervene in the military strategy 
of American forces in Iraq or Afghanistan. . . . [A] strong commitment to separation of powers 
(manifested, in part, through the doctrines of justiciability or political questions), would have made 
any review of such operations highly improbable.” Gabriella Blum, Judicial Review of 
Counterterrorism Operations, 47 JUSTICE, at 17, 19 (Spring 2010), available at http://www.intjewish 
lawyers.org/main/files/Justice_all11_3b-final.pdf (cited in Malvina Haberstam, Judicial Review, A 
Comparative Perspective: Israel, Canada and the United States, 311 CARDOZO L. REV. 2393, 2434 
n.69 (2010)). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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provided no criteria by which one can meaningfully assess whether the 
case is one requiring the country to speak in a single voice, and no clarity 
is provided when one looks at the case law.
8
 
What arguments have been offered to justify this seemingly amorphous 
and ill-defined doctrine? One justification focuses on the institutional 
legitimacy of the court.
9
 This view is associated with Alexander Bickel 
who argued in favor of the prudential use of the political question doctrine 
in order to avoid deciding difficult questions that could jeopardize the 
Court’s fragile legitimacy.10 Because the doctrine is so malleable, 
however, its use actually invites the very cynicism that its proponents seek 
to avoid.
11
 Other justifications include a variety of separation of power 
concerns, most notably the classical view espoused by Herbert Wechsler 
that limits the doctrine to cases involving issues textually committed to 
another branch.
12
 Other justifications include the difficulty of ensuring 
impartiality in decision-making when there are no legal principles to apply 
to the question presented
13
 and the fact that the executive and legislative 
branches of government have ample means to protect themselves against 
encroachment without court involvement.
14
 
Not all scholars believe that the doctrine reflects a sensible deference to 
the political branches of government. Opponents of the political question 
doctrine argue that it is inconsistent with the judicial role, which is to 
enforce the constitution and safeguard its guarantees from majority rule.
15
 
If the judicial role is to enforce the Constitution,
16
 it is inappropriate not to 
 
 
 8. For example, in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), a case involving an 
executive agreement suspending legal claims by American nationals against Iranian assets as part of 
the effort to free American hostages, the Court decided on the merits, although one might have thought 
that the issue would have been treated as a non-justiciable political question. See Gordon Silverstein & 
John Hanley, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion in Times of War and Crisis, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 
1453 (2010). And, in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), the Court declined to dismiss the case 
as a nonjusticiable political question although the case certainly implicated weighty issues of foreign 
affairs.  
 9. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 69 (2d ed. 1986); Thomas M. 
Franck, After the Fall: The New Procedural Framework for Congressional Control over the War 
Power, 71 AM. J. INT’L L. 605, 640 (1977); see also JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE 
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 295–97 (1980). 
 10. BICKEL, supra note 9. 
 11. See Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the ‘Passive Virtues’—A Comment on Principle and 
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (1964). 
 12. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6–
9 (1959).  
 13. Lon F. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 369 (1978). 
 14. CHOPER, supra note 9, at 275. 
 15. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 99–100 (1987); Redish, supra 
note 4. 
 16. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss1/3
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enforce it against the political branches. “Politically accountable bodies 
should not be entrusted to enforce any part of a document that is meant to 
restrain them.”17 Thus, opponents of the doctrine argue that its use 
confuses deference with abdication of the judicial role.
18
  
Some scholars, most prominently Louis Henkin, argue that the doctrine 
has no independent existence and that cases citing the political question 
doctrine are actually explainable by reference to alternative legal 
doctrines.
19
 Other scholars point to the “fall of the political question 
doctrine and the rise of judicial supremacy.”20 These scholars point to the 
infrequency with which the Supreme Court has invoked the doctrine to 
actually dismiss cases.
21
 Yet, the fact remains that the doctrine has 
unquestionably resulted in the dismissal of countless national security 
cases in the lower courts, most notably with respect to cases challenging 
the use of torture, targeted killing, or extraordinary rendition. To date, the 
Supreme Court has denied certiorari in every one of these cases.
22
 
An illustrative use of the political question doctrine in a national 
security case is Al-Aulaqi v. Obama.
23
 Al-Aulaqi was a Muslim cleric with 
dual US-Yemeni citizenship who was in hiding in Yemen. Al-Aulaqi was 
designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist based on evidence 
that he acted for Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (“AQAP”) and 
provided support for acts of terrorism. He reportedly had taken on an 
increasingly operational role in AQAP, facilitated training camps in 
support of acts of terrorism, and made several public statements calling for 
 
 
 17. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 133 (3d ed. 2006). 
 18. See Redish, supra note 4. 
 19. Louis Henkin, Is There a Political Question Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 600–01 (1976). 
 20. Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine 
and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 237 (2002). 
 21. One recent example is Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012), where the Court 
rejected the argument that the action was barred by the political question doctrine. The case arose 
when the Secretary of State refused to list Israel as the place of birth on a passport of an American 
citizen born in Jerusalem. Id. at 1425–26. Petitioner’s challenge was based on a federal statute, § 214 
of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, which explicitly directs the Secretary of State to record the 
birthplace as Israel. Id. at 1425.The issue in the case was whether that statute impermissibly infringes 
the President’s power to recognize foreign sovereigns. Id. at 1428. The federal district court and the 
DC Court of Appeals had dismissed the case as a non-justiciable political question. Id. at 1427. The 
Supreme Court reversed, finding that the issue for the court was not to determine the political status of 
Jerusalem but rather to determine whether the legislative branch had impermissibly intruded upon 
presidential powers under the Constitution. Id. at 1428–30. When the constitutionality of federal 
statutes is at issue, it is “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the 
law is.” Id. at 1427–28 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)).  
 22. See infra text accompanying notes 140–46. 
 23. 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010). 
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jihad against the west. Despite these activities, the United States has not 
charged him with any crime.
24
  
The lawsuit was brought by Al-Aulaqi’s father who claimed that the 
United States had authorized the targeted killing of his son by placing his 
name on a so-called “kill list” that is allegedly maintained by the Central 
Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) and the Joint Special Operations Command. 
This allegation was supported by a number of media reports, including 
National Public Radio (“NPR”) and The Washington Post, which in turn 
cited unnamed military officials.
25
 Plaintiff’s claim was that the US policy 
of authorizing the targeted killing of US citizens outside of armed conflict 
in circumstances that do not present concrete, specific, and imminent 
threats to life or physical safety, and where there are means other than 
lethal force that could reasonably be employed to neutralize any such 
threat violates the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 
seizures and the Fifth Amendment right not to be deprived of life without 
due process of law.
26
 
Unsurprisingly, the district court granted the government’s motion to 
dismiss, finding a non-justiciable political question, because “any judicial 
determination as to the propriety of a military attack on Anwar Al-Aulaqi 
would ‘require this court to elucidate the . . . standards that are to guide a 
President when he evaluates the veracity of military intelligence.’”27 
However, “there are no judicially manageable standards by which courts 
can endeavor to assess the President’s interpretation of military 
intelligence and his resulting decision—based on that intelligence—
whether to use military force against a terrorist target overseas.”28 The 
Court acknowledged the “somewhat unsettling nature of its conclusion—
that there are circumstances in which the Executive’s unilateral decision to 
kill a US citizen overseas is ‘constitutionally committed to the political 
branches’ and judicially unreviewable.”29 But, so be it. Yet that is 
precisely the result of the Court’s application of the political question 
doctrine, which insulates a decision as momentous as targeting a US 
citizen for killing from any judicial review. 
 
 
 24. Id. at 8–9. Anwar Al-Aulaqi was killed in a targeted drone attack in Yemen on September 30, 
2011. Mark Mazzetti et al., C.I.A. Strike Kills U.S.-Born Militant in a Car in Yemen, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 
1, 2011, at A1. 
 25. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 11. 
 26. Id. at 15. 
 27. Id. at 47 (quoting El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 846 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (en banc). 
 28. Id. at 47. 
 29. Id. at 52. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss1/3
  
 
 
 
 
2013] DEFERENCE OR ABDICATION 103 
 
 
 
 
Although firmly entrenched in US constitutional law, the political 
question doctrine has not been embraced by all constitutional courts. 
Israel, for example, has explicitly rejected the doctrine on the ground that 
it is inconsistent with the judicial role. Beginning in the 1980s, under the 
leadership of Justice Aharon Barak, the Israeli Supreme Court increasingly 
adjudicated challenges to military policy in the occupied territories. 
Justice Barak has repeatedly distinguished between normative 
justiciability, which he rejects, and institutional justiciability, which he 
recognizes but rarely employs.
30
 As to normative justiciability, Justice 
Barak explains: 
A claim of no normative justiciability proposes that there are no 
legal criteria for deciding a dispute that is before the court. . . . A 
claim of no normative justiciability has no legal basis in general 
because there is always a legal norm according to which a dispute 
may be decided, and the existence of a legal norm gives rise to the 
existence of legal criteria for it. Sometimes it is easy to recognize 
the norm and the criteria inherent in it and at other times it is 
difficult to do so. But ultimately a legal norm will always be found 
and legal criteria always exist.
31
 
In contrast to normative justiciability, Israel does recognize a claim of no 
institutional justiciability, which asserts “that it is not fitting that a dispute 
should be decided . . . .”32 This question asks whether it is desirable for a 
court to decide a dispute, not whether it is possible to do so. Although 
recognized in Israel, this doctrine has not been applied to cases alleging a 
violation of human rights.
33
 Thus, the Supreme Court has decided 
thousands of cases involving claims by inhabitants of the occupied 
territories
34
 including cases challenging the legality of settlements,
35
 cases 
 
 
 30. HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Defence 42 P.D. (2) 441 [1988] (Isr.), available at http:// 
elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/86/100/009/Z01/86009100.z01.pdf; HCJ 769/02 PCATI [Dec. 11, 2005] 
slip op. ¶ 48. 
 31. PCATI, slip op. ¶ 48.  
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. ¶ 50.  
 34. Id. ¶ 52.  
 35. See, e.g., HCJ 606/78 Awib v. Minister of Defence, IsrSC 33(2) 113, 124 [1979] (Isr.) (“I 
was not impressed by this argument at all. . . . It is clear that in matters of foreign policy, like in 
several other matters, the decision is made by political authorities and not by the judiciary. But on the 
assumption . . . that a person’s property has been harmed or taken away from him unlawfully, it is 
difficult to believe that the court will refuse to hear that person because his right may be the subject of 
political negotiations.”); HCJ 390/79 Dawikat v. Gov’t of Israel, IsrSC 34(1) 1, 15 [1980] (“A military 
government that wishes to violate the property rights of the individual should show a legal basis for 
doing so, and it cannot avoid judicial scrutiny of its actions by claiming non-justiciability”).  
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challenging the legality of the separation fence,
36
 cases challenging a 
policy of targeted killing,
37
 cases considering the rights of inhabitants in 
Gaza to basic necessities during combat activities,
38
 and cases determining 
the rights of local inhabitants when terrorists are arrested.
39
 Justice Barak 
explains: 
[I]t was determined that the Court does not refrain from judicial 
review merely because the military commander acts outside Israel, 
or because his actions have political and military ramifications. 
When the decisions or acts of the military commander impinge 
upon human rights, they are justiciable. The door of the Court is 
open. The argument that the impingement upon human rights is due 
to security considerations does not rule out judicial review. 
“Security considerations” or “military necessity” are not magic 
words. . . . This is appropriate from the point of view of protection 
of human rights.
40
 
An illustrative example of Justice Barak’s refusal to apply institutional 
non-justiciability to a case alleging human rights violations is the targeted 
killings case, which stands in sharp contrast to the non-justiciability of this 
issue in US courts.
41
 In Public Committee against Torture v. Government 
of Israel, petitioners argued that the government’s policy of targeted 
killings violated international law. The government argued that the case 
was not institutionally justiciable because “the predominant character of 
the matter is not legal and judicial restraint requires the court neither to 
enter the battlefield nor to consider the purely operational activities taking 
place on the battlefield.”42 Justice Barak rejected the government’s 
argument and described four limitations on the use of the institutional non-
justiciability doctrine. First, the doctrine “does not apply where 
 
 
 36. See, e.g., HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel (2) IsrLR 106 [2005] (Isr.), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4374aa674.pdf; HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village 
Council v. Gov’t of Israel 58(5) PD 807 [2004] (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ 
ENG/04/560/020/A28/04020560.A28.pdf. 
 37. PCATI, slip op. ¶ 50 (“The petition before us seeks to determine what is permitted and what 
prohibited in military operations that may violate the most basic of human rights, the right to life. The 
doctrine of institutional non-justiciability cannot prevent an examination of this question.”). 
 38. HCJ 4764/04 Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in Gaza 58(5) PD 385 [2004] 
(Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/04/640/047/A03/04047640.a03.pdf. 
 39. HCJ 3799/02 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. IDF Cent. 
Commander (2) IsrLR 206 [2005] (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/990/037/ 
A32/02037990.a32.pdf. 
 40. Mara’abe, (2) IsrLR 106, ¶ 31 (internal quotations omitted). 
 41. Compare HCJ 769/02 PCATI with Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 42. PCATI, slip op. ¶ 47. 
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recognizing it would prevent an examination of a violation of human 
rights.”43 Second, the doctrine does not apply when the question before the 
court is predominantly a legal question as opposed to a policy decision, 
and that remains true even when the decision is likely to have political and 
military ramifications.
44
 Third, the doctrine has no applicability in cases 
that involve questions that are justiciable in international courts.
45
 Finally, 
the doctrine does not apply to judicial scrutiny of a retrospective 
investigation of military operations.
46
  
The most graphic illustrations of the Court’s rejection of the political 
question doctrine arise when the Court is asked to resolve challenges to 
military practices in real time. In one case, the Court was asked to order 
the Israeli Defense Forces (“IDF”) to provide water and food to 
Palestinians during a siege at the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem 
while negotiations were underway.
47
 In Almandi v. Minister of Defense, 
the Court found the case to be justiciable, declaring that even during 
battle, the laws of war must be followed: 
The foundation of this approach is not only the pragmatic 
consequence of a political and normative reality. Its roots lie much 
deeper. It is an expression of the difference between a democratic 
state fighting for its life and the aggression of terrorists rising up 
against it. The state fights in the name of the law and in the name of 
upholding the law. The terrorists fight against the law and exploit its 
violation. The war against terror is also the law’s war against those 
who rise up against it. Moreover, the State of Israel is founded on 
Jewish and democratic values. We established a state that upholds 
the law—it fulfills its national goals, long the vision of its 
generations, while upholding human rights and ensuring human 
dignity. Between these—the vision and the law—there lies only 
harmony, not conflict.
48
  
 
 
 43. Id. ¶ 50. 
 44. Id. ¶ 51. 
 45. Id. ¶ 53. 
 46. Id. ¶ 54. 
 47. HCJ 3451/02 Almandi v. Minister of Defense 56(3) IsrSC 30 [2002] (Isr.). IDF forces 
entered Bethlehem as part of “Operation Defensive Wall,” designed to prevent the recurrence of terror 
attacks. Between thirty and forty wanted Palestinian terrorists broke into the Church of the Nativity, 
along with Palestinian security forces and civilians. The IDF surrounded the church and requested the 
Palestinians to leave. Some did, including the wounded and some clergy. Food and water were 
provided for the clergy. The sole issue in the case related to food assistance to the remaining 
Palestinians in the basilica. Id. ¶¶ 1–6. 
 48. Id. ¶ 9. 
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Perhaps the most dramatic illustrations of Israel’s rejection of the political 
question doctrine are cases that challenge the government’s decision to 
release Palestinian prisoners. In Mishlat v. Prime Minister and Almagor v. 
Government of Israel, organizations representing families of victims of 
terrorism sued to prevent the release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners 
and detainees.
49
 In both cases the Court affirmed the government’s 
decision using a reasonableness standard. However, the very fact that the 
court would find such a question to be justiciable is remarkable, 
particularly because the decision to release the prisoners was part of a long 
range diplomatic strategy aimed at strengthening the legitimacy of the 
Palestinian Authority and ultimately resolving the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict.
50
 
These cases demonstrate the willingness of the Israeli Supreme Court 
to hear national security cases, even in “real time” and even in the midst of 
ongoing political negotiations. This stands in sharp contrast to the ease 
with which US courts apply the political question doctrine to find even far 
less politically sensitive national security cases nonjusticiable.
51
 
B. Standing Doctrine 
Standing requirements are rooted in Article III of the United States 
Constitution, which has been interpreted to require the plaintiff to establish 
an actual or imminent injury, causation, and redressability.
52
 Since these 
are considered a part of the case or controversy requirement in Article III, 
the parties cannot waive them. In addition to the constitutional standing 
requirements, the Court has also established prudential rules of self-
restraint, which reflect the Court’s appreciation of its non-democratic 
character. Thus, as a general proposition, one party cannot assert the rights 
of another,
53
 a party cannot assert a mere generalized grievance shared by 
 
 
 49. HCJ1539/05 Mishlat—Legal Research Institute for Study of Terror and Aid for its Victims v. 
Prime Minister of Israel [Feb. 17, 2005] (unpublished decision), available at http://www.icrc .org/ihl-
nat.nsf/39a82e2ca42b52974125673e00508144/424c96854593fd2fc12575bc0042c8d7!OpenDocument
;HCJ 1671/05 Almagor v. Government of Israel 49(5) PD 913 [2005] (Isr.). 
 50. Id. 
 51. For a discussion of the two courts’ use of similar considerations in applying the political 
question doctrine in the years prior to the mid-1970s, see YAACOV S. ZEMACH, POLITICAL QUESTIONS 
IN THE COURTS: A JURIDICAL FUNCTION IN DEMOCRACIES ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES 175–210 
(1976). 
 52. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 
(1984). 
 53. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
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all,
54
 and a plaintiff must be within the zone of interest protected by the 
challenged statute.
55
 
These rules often immunize allegedly unlawful governmental activity 
from judicial scrutiny. In fact, the standing doctrine may mean that no one 
has standing to challenge governmental action. The Court acknowledged 
as much in United States v. Richardson: 
It can be argued that if respondent is not permitted to litigate this 
issue, no one can do so. In a very real sense, the absence of any 
particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives support to 
the argument that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance 
of Congress, and ultimately to the political process.
56
  
In other words, the remedy to challenge unlawful governmental activity 
when judicial review is foreclosed is the political remedy: to vote the 
offenders out of office. 
Once again, the targeted killing case presents a graphic example of how 
this justiciability doctrine has been used to dismiss national security cases. 
In Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, as previously described, the father of an individual 
whose name was placed on a “kill list” challenged the proposed targeted 
killing of his son.
57
 The Court considered various bases for standing, 
rejecting all of them. Specifically, the Court rejected “next friend” 
standing for two reasons. First, the father had not adequately explained the 
inability of his son to appear on his own behalf—the fact that he was in 
hiding under threat of death was insufficient. Second, the father failed to 
establish that he was acting in accordance with the wishes or intent of his 
son since he presented no evidence that his son wanted to vindicate his 
constitutional rights through the US judicial system.
58
 The Court also 
rejected third party standing because the father’s assertion that the 
government’s decision to target his son for killing constituted a harm to 
the father was insufficient to establish an Article III injury.
59
  
In sharp contrast to the United States’ strict standing requirements, the 
Israeli Supreme Court has dramatically liberalized its rules of standing. In 
doing so, Justice Barak has noted that different philosophies regarding 
 
 
 54. Id. at 499. 
 55. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). 
 56. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974). 
 57. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 58. Id. at 8–14. 
 59. Id. at 15–25. 
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standing reflect different philosophies regarding “the role of judicial 
review in public law, and the role of the judge in a democratic society.”60  
Israel currently recognizes “public petitioner” standing when the case 
involves a matter of particular public importance.
61
 This loosening of the 
standing requirements has been characterized as revolutionary
62
 and 
effectively abolishing standing.
63
 Indeed, in a case challenging the legality 
of an order issued by the West Bank military commander to detain 
security suspects, Justice Barak stated, “Not only may the detainee himself 
appeal to the Court, but his family may also do so. Furthermore, under our 
approach to the issue of standing, any person or organization interested in 
the fate of the detainee may also do so.”64 Thus, the vast majority of cases 
brought to challenge military practices in the occupied territories have 
been brought by NGOs, oftentimes based on news accounts of military 
actions. While some have sharply criticized this practice,
65
 the Court 
defends its relaxed standing rules by arguing that “[c]losing this Court’s 
doors before the petitioner without an interest, who sounds the alarm 
concerning an unlawful government action, does damage to the rule of 
law. Access to the courts is the cornerstone of the rule of law.”66 
C. State Secrets Privilege 
In the US, the state secrets doctrine has two aspects: the Totten bar and 
the Reynolds privilege.
67
 The Totten bar precludes judicial scrutiny 
entirely, which means its application results in the dismissal of the action 
at the initial stage of litigation. The Reynolds privilege is an evidentiary 
privilege that results in the exclusion of specific evidence, which may or 
may not result in the dismissal of the claim. 
 
 
 60. HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Defence 42(2) PD 441 [1988] (Isr.). 
 61. Id. ¶ 22. 
 62. Gidon Sapir, Religion and State in Israel: The Case for Reevaluation and Constitutional 
Entrenchment, 22 HASTINGS INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 617, 665 n.154 (1999). 
 63. Gerald Gunther, A Model Judicial Biography, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2117, 2126 n.32 (1999) 
(reviewing PNINA LAHAV, JUDGMENT IN JERUSALEM: CHIEF JUSTICE SIMON AGRANAT AND THE 
ZIONIST CENTURY (1997)). 
 64. HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. IDF Commander in the West Bank slip op. ¶ 46 [July 28, 2002] (Isr.), 
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/390/032/A04/02032390.A04.pdf. 
 65. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 7, at 2413. Indeed, legislation has been introduced in Israel that 
would prohibit NGOs from filing petitions in the High Court of Justice unless they are properly 
registered in Israel with a Certificate of Proper Management and not receiving funding from a foreign 
government. Id. at 2440 n.88. 
 66. HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Defence 42(2) PD 441, ¶ 22 [1988]. 
 67. See Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900, 1905–06 (2011); Mohamed v. 
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2010), cert denied 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011). 
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The Totten bar is based on an 1876 case, Totten v United States,
68
 
where the estate of a Civil War spy sued the United States for not paying 
him for his espionage activities. The claim was dismissed because it was 
based on the existence of a contract for secret services with the 
government, which was a fact that could not be disclosed. The Totten bar 
was applied a century later by the Supreme Court in Weinberger v. 
Catholic Action of Hawaii,
69
 which was a suit under the National 
Environmental Act to compel the Navy to prepare an environmental 
impact statement for a military facility, where the Navy was allegedly 
planning to store nuclear weapons. The claim was dismissed because 
“[d]ue to national security reasons . . . the Navy can neither admit nor 
deny that it proposes to store nuclear weapons” at the facility.70 The 
Supreme Court applied the Totten bar in 2005 in Tenet v. Doe,
71
 where 
two Cold War spies claimed that the CIA had failed to pay them for 
espionage services. The claim was dismissed because the government 
could not even reveal the existence of the relationship between the 
plaintiffs and the government.
72
 Most recently, the Court applied the 
Totten bar in General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, where a 
government contractor sued the United States for terminating a contract to 
develop stealth aircraft.
73
 In dismissing the case, the Court cautioned, “In 
Reynolds, we warned that the state secrets evidentiary privilege ‘is not to 
be lightly invoked.’ Courts should be even more hesitant to declare a 
Government contract unenforceable because of state secrets. It is the 
option of last resort, available in a very narrow set of circumstances.”74 
The second aspect or form of the state secrets doctrine is the Reynolds 
privilege, defined as a well-established principle in the law of evidence 
that provides “a privilege against revealing military or state secrets.”75 
Unlike the Totten bar, the assertion of this privilege removes the 
privileged evidence from the litigation but does not necessarily bar the 
lawsuit.  
 
 
 68. 92 U.S. 105 (1876). 
 69. 454 U.S. 139 (1981). 
 70. Id. at 146–47. 
 71. 544 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 72. Id. at 8–10. 
 73. General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900 (2011). 
 74. Id. at 1910 (internal citations omitted). The Court applied the state secrets doctrine to dismiss 
the case but explained that “our decision today clarifies the consequences of its use only where it 
precludes a valid defense in Government-contracting disputes, and only where both sides have enough 
evidence to survive summary judgment but too many of the relevant facts remain obscured by the 
state-secrets privilege to enable a reliable judgment.” Id. 
 75. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1953). 
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The Reynolds privilege derives its name from a 1953 torts case entitled 
United States v. Reynolds.
76
 Plaintiffs were the estates of three civilian 
observers killed in a crash of a military aircraft carrying secret electronic 
equipment. Plaintiffs sought production of the Air Force’s accident report 
and the statements of three surviving crewmembers. The Air Force refused 
to produce the materials, citing national security. The district court ordered 
the material disclosed for in camera review, and when the government 
refused, the Court sanctioned the government by establishing the facts on 
plaintiffs’ negligence case in plaintiffs’ favor. On appeal, the Supreme 
Court reversed and sustained the government’s assertion of privilege 
because “there was a reasonable danger that the accident investigation 
report would contain references to the secret electronic equipment which 
was the primary concern of the mission.”77 The Court also said that the 
district court should not have required production of the documents for in 
camera inspection.
78
  
The state secrets doctrine has been repeatedly invoked in the post 9/11 
world and has prevented challenges to various anti-terrorism policies from 
being heard. Most torture cases and cases challenging extraordinary 
rendition have been dismissed at the pleading stage due to this doctrine.
79
 
One example is Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.
80
 As described more 
fully below, the Ninth Circuit held that permitting a case challenging 
extraordinary rendition to go forward would create an unjustifiable risk of 
disclosing state secrets and would unjustifiably harm legitimate national 
security interests. The Court said “the claims and possible defenses are so 
infused with state secrets that the risk of disclosing them is both apparent 
and inevitable.”81 Ironically, the Court explained that it could not explain 
that result with more specificity because that too would entail revealing 
state secrets.
82
  
 
 
 76. 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 77. Id. at 10. 
 78. Id. at 10–11. 
 79. See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 947 
(2007); Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 2442 (2011); see also Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 
(2010). The Ashcroft Court refused to recognize a Bivens claim on behalf of a non-citizen because 
“absent clear congressional authorization, the judicial review of extraordinary rendition would offend 
the separation of powers and inhibit this country's foreign policy.” Ashcroft, 585 F.3d at 576. 
 80. 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 81. Id. at 1089. 
 82. Id. The Court did explain that, given the public acknowledgement of the program, it was not 
holding that the existence of the extraordinary rendition program was a state secret. Rather, the 
specifics of the program remain a state secret. Id. at 1090. 
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Israel approaches the state secrets doctrine differently. Its so-called 
national security privilege does not work as an absolute privilege, but 
rather requires balancing.
83
 Israel’s rejection of an absolute privilege 
reflects Israel’s starting point, which is that cases challenging the 
infringement of human rights are justiciable, even when the government 
asserts national security interests. So the Israeli courts are more likely to 
use in camera review to assess the validity of an asserted national security 
interest.
84
 One example is Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. 
Israel,
85
 where the Supreme Court heard the challenge to Israel’s use of 
coercive interrogation techniques despite the government’s claim of 
national security concerns. The Court said it would not allow the privilege 
to “consign [Israel’s] fight against terrorism to the twilight shadows of the 
law.”86  
D. Scope of Judicial Review 
In those rare cases where the United States Supreme Court has not 
invoked one of the justiciability doctrines to preclude judicial review of 
national security cases, the scope of that review is typically quite 
deferential. Consider, for example, Holder v. Humanitarian Law,
87
 the 
Court’s first post 9/11 First Amendment case, where the Court exhibited 
unprecedented deference to the government, despite purporting to apply 
strict scrutiny to a content-based speech restriction.
88
 The case concerned 
the constitutionality, as applied, of a statute that prohibited providing 
 
 
 83. Sudha Setty, Litigating Secrets: Comparative Perspectives on the State Secrets Privilege, 75 
BROOKLYN L. REV. 201, 245 (2009). 
 84. Id. at 248. 
 85. HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture v. Government of Israel 53(4) PD 817 
[1999] (Isr.), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Public_Committee_Against_Tor 
ture.pdf (unofficial version).  
 86. Id. ¶ 40. 
 87. 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
 88. Id. at 2711. The Holder court’s willingness to defer to the political branches in a case 
involving a content-based speech restriction stands in sharp contrast to the Court’s vigorous review of 
a prior restraint in the Vietnam War era. In New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), the 
Court employed a heavy presumption against the constitutional validity of a prior restraint, placing a 
heavy burden of justification on the government. Six members of the court, each writing separately, 
found that the government had failed to meet its burden despite claims that the release of the Pentagon 
Papers would jeopardize national security, undermine alliances abroad, impair the ability of diplomats 
to negotiate, prolong the war, and endanger the lives of soldiers. Id. at 762–63. Justice Black wrote 
“[t]he word ‘security’ is a broad, vague generality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate 
the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment.” Id. at 719. One way to reconcile Holder and 
the Pentagon Papers case is to note that in Holder, the Court was reviewing not just executive action 
but legislative authorization, whereas in New York Times, the court was reviewing executive power 
that had not been authorized by Congress. 
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material support to a terrorist organization. The question in the case 
focused on the statute’s applicability to lawful, non-violent forms of 
assistance, such as training members of the organization to use 
humanitarian and international law to resolve disputes and teaching 
members to petition bodies like the United Nations for relief. In upholding 
the statute’s applicability to those forms of assistance, the majority 
accepted at face value the government’s assertion that legal, non-violent 
support actually assists terrorist activities because money is fungible and 
because such activities add legitimacy to the organization. “That 
evaluation of the facts by the Executive, like Congress’ assessment, is 
entitled to deference.”89 Although the Court paid lip service to the notion 
that “concerns of national security and foreign relations do not warrant 
abdication of the judicial role,”90 it nevertheless concluded that “when it 
comes to collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences in this area, 
‘the lack of competence on the part of the courts is marked’ and respect for 
the Government’s conclusions is appropriate.”91 The Court elaborated: 
One reason for that respect is that national security and foreign 
policy concerns arise in connection with efforts to confront evolving 
threats in an area where information can be difficult to obtain and 
the impact of certain conduct difficult to assess.
92
 
. . . . 
The Government, when seeking to prevent imminent harms in the 
context of international affairs and national security, is not required 
to conclusively link all the pieces in the puzzle before we grant 
weight to its empirical conclusions.
93
  
In the Guantanamo cases, however, the Court was less willing to 
permit the political branches to paint with such a broad brush. In each 
case,
94
 the Court rejected the government’s call for sweeping, unchecked 
authority, asserting the power of judicial review to evaluate the detainee’s 
constitutional claims: 
 
 
 89. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2727. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. (citing Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981)). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 2728. The Holder court cites Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (“[B]ecause of the 
changeable and explosive nature of contemporary international relations, . . . Congress . . . must of 
necessity paint with a brush broader than that it customarily wields in domestic areas.”). 
 94. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank 
check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s 
citizens. Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions 
for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy 
organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role 
for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.
95
 
Yet, despite handing stunning defeats to the administration in each of the 
Guantanamo cases, the Court nevertheless exhibited restraint in 
proscribing the circumstances attendant to indefinite detention and the 
procedures that must be afforded detainees challenging their enemy 
combatant status. The Court acknowledged that “[in] considering both the 
procedural and substantive standards used to impose detention to prevent 
acts of terrorism, proper deference must be accorded to the political 
branches.”96 However, “[s]ecurity subsists, too, in fidelity to freedom’s 
first principles. Chief among these are freedom from arbitrary and 
unlawful restraint and the personal liberty that is secured by adherence to 
the separation of powers.”97 
An example of the Court refusing to grant carte blanche to the 
government while also exhibiting considerable deference to the 
government is Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, where the Court held that an American 
citizen apprehended abroad must be afforded due process. But the Court 
did not detail precisely what due process requires beyond notice and an 
opportunity to rebut before a neutral fact finder.
98
 Instead, the Court 
deferred to the executive branch and stated that “the exigencies of the 
circumstances may demand that, aside from these core elements, enemy-
combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon 
potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict.”99 
 
 
 95. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 536. 
 96. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. at 796. 
 97. Id. at 797. 
 98. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 533. 
 99. Id. Thus, the executive branch could permit the use of hearsay or rebuttable presumptions or 
burden shifting. The Court stated:  
Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from 
the Government in such a proceeding. Likewise, the Constitution would not be offended by a 
presumption in favor of the Government's evidence, so long as that presumption remained a 
rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided. Thus, once the Government 
puts forth credible evidence that the habeas petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria, the 
onus could shift to the petitioner to rebut that evidence with more persuasive evidence that he 
falls outside the criteria.  
Id. at 533–34. 
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Similarly, in Boumediene v. Bush, the Court held that detainees at 
Guantanamo have the constitutional right to petition for habeas relief and 
that the procedures contained in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 do 
not constitute an adequate substitute for habeas corpus.
100
 The Court 
refused, however, to delineate what procedures habeas demands: “We do 
not endeavor to offer a comprehensive summary of the requisites for an 
adequate substitute for habeas corpus.”101  
Thus, the Guantanamo cases illustrate the Court’s willingness to assert 
the power of judicial review to issues of detention of suspected terrorists 
but to simultaneously decline to be prescriptive in terms of what the 
Constitution demands. 
The level of deference exhibited by the United States Supreme Court is 
roughly comparable or somewhat higher than the deference extended by 
the Israeli Supreme Court. Justice Barak repeatedly distinguishes legal 
questions, over which the Court has preeminent expertise, from military 
questions, over which the executive branch has the professional security 
expertise. Thus, the Court determines whether the executive understood 
the law correctly, not whether the executive understood the law in a 
reasonable manner.
102
 But having determined what the law is, the Court 
then asks whether “the decision of the military commander falls within the 
zone of reasonable activity on the part of the military commander. If the 
answer is yes, the Court will not exchange the military commander’s 
security discretion with the security discretion of the court.”103  
A study of cases brought by Palestinians against the Military 
Commander in the period 1990–2005 reveals a dramatic decline in the 
level of deference shown to the military commander.
104
 The authors of that 
study posit that this is due to the prolonged nature of the conflict. “The 
longer the armed conflict lasts, the more the Court is exposed to cases of 
poor judgment and unnecessary infringement of rights by the commander, 
which leads to a deterioration of trust, and as a result, diminished 
 
 
 100. Although Boumediene was seen as a serious setback for the Bush administration, it actually 
left many important issues unresolved including whether the holding would apply at Bagram, what 
procedures would constitute an adequate substitute for habeas, and the reach of the writ to claims of 
unlawful treatment or confinement. 
 101. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. at 779.  
 102. HCJ 769/02 PCATI [Dec. 11, 2005] slip op. ¶ 56. 
 103. Id. ¶ 57. 
 104. See Guy Davidov & Amnon Reichman, Prolonged Armed Conflict and Diminished 
Deference to the Military: Lessons from Israel, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 919 (2010). 
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deference.”105 A second possible explanation may be the “ascent of human 
rights discourse” and proportionality analysis within the Israeli legal 
system.
106
 
In virtually all of the national security cases it has heard, the Court 
consistently explained: 
The mere fact that the action is called for on the military level does 
not mean that it is lawful on the legal level. Indeed, we do not 
substitute the discretion of the military commander, regarding 
military considerations. That is his expertise. We examine their 
results on the humanitarian law level. That is our expertise.
107
 
Thus, in a case questioning the route of the separation fence, Justice Barak 
stated: 
The military commander is the expert regarding the military quality 
of the separation fence route. We are experts regarding its 
humanitarian aspects. The military commander determines where, 
on hill and plain, the separation fence will be erected. That is his 
expertise. We examine whether this route’s harm to the local 
residents is proportional. That is our expertise.
108
 
Similarly, in a case involving the forced relocation of individuals from the 
West Bank to the Gaza Strip, the Court stated: 
In exercising judicial review, we do not turn ourselves into experts 
in security affairs. We do not substitute the security considerations 
 
 
 105. Id. at 948–49. The authors go on to explain:  
This is not to suggest that the Court necessarily developed mistrust in the integrity of the 
military personnel, but rather that the Court has been willing to look closer at cases it would, 
under acute emergencies, have only given short shrift, and upon such closer look, the balance 
of security considerations and the protection of human rights reached by the commander 
appears off kilter enough to warrant judicial pressure for a settlement more favorable to the 
petitioner. The data appear to be more consistent with this hypothesis than with any other. 
Id. at 949. 
 106. Id. at 953. 
 107. HCJ 4764/04 Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in Gaza 58(5) PD 385, 393 
[2004]. 
 108. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Gov’t of Israel 58(5) PD 807, ¶ 48 [2004]. The 
Court further stated: 
We, Justices of the Supreme Court, are not experts in military affairs. We shall not examine 
whether the military commander’s military opinion corresponds to ours—to the extent that 
we have an opinion regarding the military character of the route. So we act in all questions 
which are matters of professional expertise, and so we act in military affairs as well. All we 
can determine is whether a reasonable military commander would have set out the route as 
this military commander did. 
Id. ¶ 46. 
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of the military commander with our own security considerations. 
We take no position regarding the way security affairs are run. Our 
task is to guard the borders and to maintain the boundaries of the 
military commander’s discretion. . . . It is true, that “the security of 
the state” is not a “magic word” which makes judicial review 
disappear. Thus, we shall not be deterred from reviewing the 
decisions of the military commander . . . simply because of the 
important security considerations anchoring his decision. However, 
we shall not substitute the discretion of the commander with our 
own discretion. We shall check the legality of the discretion of the 
military commander and ensure that his decisions fall within the 
“zone of reasonableness.”109 
The Israeli Supreme Court displays considerable deference when 
reviewing the constitutionality of an act of the Knesset, although this 
reflects concerns about separation of powers as much as about relative 
levels of expertise. Thus, in Iyyad v. State of Israel, where members of 
Hezbollah operating in the Gaza Strip challenged the constitutionality of 
the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, the Court determined that 
the law fell within the margins of proportionality. The Court stated: 
The court will not be quick to intervene and set aside a provision of 
statute enacted by the legislature. The court should uphold the law 
as an expression of the will of the people. This is an expression of 
the principle of separation of powers: the legislative authority 
determines the measures that should be taken in order to achieve 
public goals, whereas the judicial authority examines whether those 
measures violate basic rights in contravention of the conditions 
provided for this purpose in the Basic Law. It is the legislature that 
determines national policy and formulates it in statute, whereas the 
court scrutinizes the constitutionality of the legislation to discover 
to what extent it violates constitutional human rights. It has 
therefore been held in the case law of this court that when we 
examine the legislation from the Knesset from the perspective of the 
limitations clause, the court will act “with judicial restraint, caution 
 
 
 109. HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [Sept. 3, 2002] slip op. ¶ 30 (Isr.), 
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/150/070/A15/02070150.A15.pdf. The same 
approach was taken in the targeted killing case. Justice Barak stated “The question is not what I would 
decide in the given circumstances, rather whether the decision that the military commander made is a 
decision that a reasonable military commander was permitted to make. On that subject, special weight 
is to be granted to the military opinion of the official who bears the responsibility for security.” HCJ 
769/02 PCATI [Dec. 11, 2005] slip op. ¶ 57. 
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and moderation.” The court will not refrain from constitutional 
scrutiny of legislation, but it will act with care and exercise its 
constitutional scrutiny in order to protect human rights within the 
restrictions of the limitations clause, while refraining from 
reformulating the policy that the legislature saw fit to adopt. Thus 
the delicate balance between majority rule and the principle of the 
separation of powers on the one hand and the protection of the basic 
values of the legal system and human rights on the other will be 
maintained.
110
 
As this brief survey indicates, both courts exhibit considerable deference 
to the political branches and display a real reticence when it comes to 
straightjacketing the executive. As the next section indicates, even when 
the court rules against the government, it does so in ways that show 
respect for the coordinate branches of government and that permit those 
branches to fine tune their policies within the broad parameters set forth 
by the court.  
III. “WAR ON TERRORISM” CASES OF THE SUPREME COURTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL  
A. Targeted Killing 
The targeted killing cases present the clearest example of how the two 
court systems differ. In the United States, the issue of targeted killing has 
been found to be non-justiciable, whereas in Israel, the challenge was 
heard and resolved on the merits. 
As described in Part I above, the United States’ targeted killing policy 
was challenged in Al-Aulaqi v. Obama.
111
 The father of an American 
citizen on the targeted killing list argued that the US policy of authorizing 
the targeted killing of US citizens outside of armed conflict in 
circumstances that do not present concrete, specific and imminent threats 
to life or physical safety, and where there are means other than lethal force 
that could reasonably be employed to neutralize any such threat violates 
his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.
112
 Plaintiff’s attorney explained, 
“the central proposition of [this challenge] was that the courts have a role 
 
 
 110. CrimA (TA) 6659/06 A v. State of Israel, 47 I.L.M. 768, 771 [2008] (Isr.). 
 111. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 112. Id. at 12. Anwar al-Aulaqi was killed in a targeted drone attack in Yemen on September 30, 
2011. Mark Mazzetti et al., C.I.A. Strike Kills U.S.-Born Militant in a Car in Yemen, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 
1, 2011, at A1.  
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to play in articulating the standards under which lethal force is used and in 
ensuring that the government actually complies with those standards.”113 
The Court rejected this proposition and granted the government’s motion 
to dismiss because the case presented a non-justiciable political question 
and because petitioner lacked standing. 
In contrast, the Israeli Supreme Court found the issue to be justiciable 
and addressed the merits of the lawfulness of Israel’s targeted killing 
policy. The government adopted the policy after the outbreak of the 
second intifada in 2000, which resulted in 1000 Israelis being killed and 
thousands more injured, with the Palestinians suffering the same rate of 
casualties and injuries.
114
 Pursuant to the policy, Israeli defense forces 
targeted those who planned, ordered, or carried out terrorist activities 
against Israel. The articulated purpose of the policy was to prevent terrorist 
activities before they occurred. The policy resulted in the deaths of 
approximately 300 operatives and 150 civilians near the locations of the 
targets, plus injuries to hundreds of others.
115
  
The legality of the targeted killings policy was challenged in Public 
Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel.
116
 Finding 
the case justiciable and utilizing international law, the Court concluded 
that targeted killings are neither always permitted nor always prohibited. 
International customary law establishes the governing rule structure: 
civilians are not protected from being attacked for such time as they are 
taking a direct part in hostilities.
117
 But that principle itself requires 
interpretation. What does “take part in hostilities” mean? How do we 
distinguish taking a direct part from taking an indirect part? What does “at 
that time” mean?  
The Court defined the term “take part in hostilities” to mean all those 
acts that by their nature and purpose are intended to cause harm to armed 
forces or civilians.
118
 This includes using weapons, collecting intelligence, 
and preparing for hostilities.
119
  
The Court next attempted to distinguish taking a “direct part” from 
taking an “indirect part” and conceded that the difference is rather murky. 
Examples of the former include collecting information about the armed 
 
 
 113. Jameel Jaffer, Targeted Killing and the Courts: A Response to Alan Dershowitz, 37 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 5315, 5317 (2011). 
 114. PCATI, slip op. ¶ 1. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. ¶ 60. 
 117. Id. ¶ 19. 
 118. Id. ¶ 33. 
 119. Id. 
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forces, leading unlawful combatants to where the hostilities are being 
carried out, or operating weapons being used by unlawful combatants or 
supervising their operation.
120
 Examples of the latter include supplying 
food or medicine, providing general strategic analysis, supplying logistical 
support such as money, and disseminating propaganda.
121
 What about the 
driver of a vehicle carrying ammunition? The Court concludes that that 
activity would be treated as taking a direct part in hostilities if the 
ammunition was being transported to the place where it will be used to 
carry out the hostilities. What about those who act as a human shield? 
They would be treated as taking a direct part in hostilities so long as they 
were acting voluntarily. What about the higher-ups who plan the attack or 
send others to carry it out? They would clearly be included.
122
 
Next, the Court explored the meaning of the term “for such time.” The 
civilian loses protection from being attacked only “for such time” as 
he/she is taking a part in hostilities.
123
 This too is a murky area requiring 
case-by-case resolution, unless the case falls within one of two extremes. 
At one extreme is a civilian who takes a direct part in hostilities once and 
then severs all ties. Such a civilian is easily entitled to protection.
124
 On the 
opposite end of the spectrum is a civilian who joins a terrorist organization 
and carries out a series of attacks. The civilian is not entitled to protection 
in between operations.
125
 In between these extremes “lie the grey areas” 
which require case-by-case decision-making.
126
 
In order to resolve cases falling within this grey area, the court 
announced four conditions that must be met to establish the legality of a 
targeted killing.
127
 First, there must be reliable information that the civilian 
is taking a direct part in hostilities with a heavy burden of proof resting on 
the government. Second, if capture and arrest is possible, it is required 
because a trial is clearly preferable to the use of force. Third, after the 
attack, the government must conduct a thorough and independent 
investigation to verify the identity of the person attacked and to verify the 
circumstances of the attack. Fourth, any harm to innocent civilians must 
satisfy the principle of proportionality.
128
 
 
 
 120. Id. ¶¶ 34, 35. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. ¶¶ 35–37. 
 123. Id. ¶ 39. 
 124. Id. ¶ 40. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
120 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 12:95 
 
 
 
 
Proportionality is determined using an ethical test that seeks a balance 
between military advantage and harm to civilians:  
A balance should be struck between the duty of the state to protect 
the lives of its soldiers and civilians and its duty to protect the lives 
of innocent civilians who are harmed when targeting terrorists. This 
balance is a difficult one, because it concerns human life. It gives 
rise to moral and ethical problems. But despite the difficulty, the 
balance must be struck.
129
  
Proportionality presents a legal question, although one without precise 
criteria. The court’s task is to determine whether the executive branch has 
acted within the limits of the margin of proportionality. While the 
executive has discretion when acting within those limits, it is the court’s 
duty to act as the guardian of those limits.
130
 
Thus, the upshot of the decision is to permit targeted killings when the 
civilian is taking a direct part in hostilities, provided that there is no less 
harmful alternative, and provided further that innocents in the vicinity are 
not harmed or, if they are, that the principle of proportionality is satisfied.  
This case is a good example of the Israeli Supreme Court’s willingness 
to address the legality of a military policy on the merits while at the same 
time crafting a decision that leaves the executive branch with considerable 
discretion. 
B. Torture 
The torture cases present another good example of the differences 
between the two Supreme Courts. In the United States, no torture case has 
been found to be justiciable.
131
 Instead, the courts have relied on the state 
secrets privilege to dismiss challenges to the use of torture and have thus 
refused to address the merits of the legality of torture under either 
domestic or international law. 
The United States admits to the use of “extraordinary rendition” 
described as “outsourcing torture”132 whereby terrorism suspects are sent 
to a foreign state for the purpose of subjecting them to methods of 
interrogation that are illegal in the United States. Extraordinary rendition 
 
 
 129. Id. ¶ 46. 
 130. Id. ¶ 58. 
 131. Supra note 146. 
 132. Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s ‘Extraordinary 
Rendition’ Program, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106. 
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started in the mid 90s, but after 9/11 “went out of control.”133 Although it 
is impossible to know the actual number of individuals subject to 
extraordinary rendition, 150 people have been thought to be rendered since 
9/11.
134
  
One of those people was Binyam Mohamed, who was arrested in 
Pakistan, flown to Morocco, transferred to American custody and flown to 
Afghanistan where he was detained in a CIA “dark prison.”135 He and four 
others who had also been subject to extraordinary rendition sued Jeppesen 
Dataplan, a US company, which allegedly “played an integral role in the 
forced abduction” by providing flight planning and logistical support 
services to the aircraft and crew.
136
 The complaint alleged that the 
plaintiffs suffered horrific torture in “black site prisons” in Afghanistan, 
Egypt and Morocco.
137
 The district court dismissed the suit finding that “at 
the core of Plaintiffs’ case against Defendant Jeppesen are ‘allegations’ of 
covert US military or CIA operations in foreign countries against foreign 
nationals—clearly a subject matter which is a state secret.”138 A three 
judge panel of the 9th Circuit reversed, calling into question the use of the 
state secret doctrine to cover the entire subject matter of the litigation. The 
Court explained: 
 At base, the government argues here that state secrets form the 
subject matter of a lawsuit, and therefore require dismissal, any time 
a complaint contains allegations, the truth or falsity of which has 
been classified as secret by a government official. The district court 
agreed, dismissing the case exclusively because it “involves 
‘allegations' about [secret] conduct by the CIA.” This sweeping 
characterization of the “very subject matter” bar has no logical 
limit-it would apply equally to suits by U.S. citizens, not just 
foreign nationals; and to secret conduct committed on U.S. soil, not 
just abroad. According to the government's theory, the Judiciary 
should effectively cordon off all secret government actions from 
judicial scrutiny, immunizing the CIA and its partners from the 
demands and limits of the law. 
 
 
 133. Id. at 145. 
 134. Id. at 138. 
 135. Mohamed v. Jeppeson Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 2442 (2011). 
 136. Id. at 1075. 
 137. Id. at 1074–75. 
 138. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
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 We reject this interpretation of the “very subject matter” 
concept, not only because it is unsupported by the case law, but 
because it forces an unnecessary zero-sum decision between the 
Judiciary’s constitutional duty “to say what the law is,” and the 
Executive's constitutional duty “to preserve the national security.” 
We simply need not place the “co-equal branches of the 
Government” on an all-or-nothing “collision course.”139  
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed, finding that the state secrets 
doctrine required dismissal of the action, and the Supreme Court denied 
cert.
140
 
This is not the first time the federal courts have declined to address the 
merits of allegations of torture. The Supreme Court denied cert in the 
highly publicized case involving Maher Arar, an innocent Canadian who 
was sent to Syria to be tortured,
141
 and again in the case of Khaled El-
Masri, a German citizen of Lebanese descent sent to an Afghanistan prison 
to be tortured.
142
 The Second Circuit had dismissed Arar’s case, rejecting a 
Bivens claim in the context of extraordinary rendition because “it is for the 
Executive in the first instance to decide how to implement extraordinary 
rendition, and for the elected members of Congress—and not for us as 
judges—to decide whether an individual may seek compensation from 
government officers and employees directly, or from the government, for a 
constitutional violation.”143 The Fourth Circuit had dismissed El-Masri’s 
claim, based on the state secrets doctrine, explaining that even though 
there has been public disclosure of the practice of extraordinary rendition, 
“the public information does not include the facts that are central to 
litigating his action. Rather, those central facts—the CIA means and 
methods that form the subject matter of El-Masri’s claim—remain state 
secrets.”144 The Court rejected El-Masri’s request for in camera viewing of 
the secret information in lieu of dismissal finding that the Supreme Court 
had expressly foreclosed that remedy in United States v. Reynolds. The 
Court explained, “Reynolds plainly held that when ‘the occasion for the 
privilege is appropriate . . . the court should not jeopardize the security 
 
 
 139. Mohamed v. Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc, 614 F.3d 1070 
(9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). 
 140. Mohamed v, Jeppeson Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
2442 (2011). 
 141. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010). 
 142. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 947 (2007). 
 143. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d at 565. 
 144. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 311. 
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which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of 
the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers.’”145 Thus, in cases 
alleging torture, the federal courts have refused to address the merits and 
the Supreme Court has denied cert.
146
 
In sharp contrast, the Supreme Court of Israel has ruled that torture is 
illegal under both Israeli domestic law and international law.
147
 In reaching 
this result, the Court noted that “the interrogation practices of the police in 
a given regime are indicative of a regime’s very character.”148 
In Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel, the 
Supreme Court was confronted with the question of the legality of specific 
interrogation methods including shaking, use of the Shabach method,
149
 
requiring detainees to crouch on their toes for five minutes, painful 
cuffing, covering the detainee’s head, intentional sleep deprivation, and 
loud music. The Court concluded that each of these methods was 
prohibited under international and domestic law, both of which prohibit 
torture, cruel and inhuman treatment, and degrading conduct. These are 
absolute prohibitions, permitting no balancing or exceptions.
150
 
In concluding that each of the challenged methods of interrogation was 
unlawful, the Court noted the tension between two competing values: the 
need to uncover the truth in order to protect society and the need to protect 
the dignity and liberty of individuals. Balancing those conflicting values 
produces “rules for a reasonable interrogation.”151 
 
 
 145. Id. at 311 (citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1053)). This aspect of Reynolds 
has come under criticism. At a March 24, 2011 conference at Fordham Law School entitled “The State 
Secrets Privilege and Access to Justice: What is the Proper Balance,” the two judges on the panel 
expressed the view that the judicial role cannot be fully exercised without judicial review of the 
allegedly privileged material. Both judges took the position that there must be careful in camera 
review in order to evaluate the government’s contention that the specified materials contain sensitive 
state secrets. Hon. Robert D Sack & Hon. John D. Bates, Panel Discussion, The State Secrets Privilege 
and Access to Justice: What is the Proper Balance?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2011), available at 
http://fordhamlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/Vol_80/Reed_October.pdf. 
 146. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009), cert denied, 130 S.Ct. 3409 (2010); El-Masri 
v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 947 (2007). For cases refusing to 
recognize a cause of action for damages against soldiers or others in the chain of command for abusive 
interrogation, see Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Lebron v. Runsfeld, 670 
F3d. 540 (4th Cir. 2012); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390 (D.D.C. 2012); Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 
762 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 147. HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. Gov’t of Israel 53(4) PD 817 [1999], available 
at  http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Public_Committee_Against_Torture.pdf (unofficial version). 
 148. Id. ¶ 22. 
 149. The Shabach method means cuffing the prisoner to a low chair, covering his head with a 
sack, and playing loud music. Id. ¶ 21. 
 150. Id. ¶ 23. 
 151. Id. ¶ 22. 
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The State relied on the ticking bomb argument, contending that the 
justification and necessity defense authorizes the interrogation practices. 
The Court rejected that argument, distinguishing between the offensive 
and defensive use of the doctrine. GSS officers may avail themselves of 
the defense if they are criminally prosecuted. But, the issue in this case did 
not involve the defensive use of the doctrine. Rather, the issue before the 
Court was whether the necessity defense ex ante authorizes the methods. 
The Court explicitly held that the doctrine does not define a code of 
normative behavior and that the principle of necessity cannot serve as a 
basis of authority.
152
 Authorization must come from the legislature. The 
Court did not decide whether the legislature could or should authorize 
physical means of interrogation, but it did point out that if such legislation 
is passed, it must “befit the values of the State of Israel, [be] enacted for a 
proper purpose, and infringe the suspect’s liberty to an extent no greater 
than required.”153 
As to how the Court’s decision would affect the state’s ability to 
prevent acts of terrorism, the Court said: 
We are aware that this decision does not make it easier to deal with 
[the difficult reality in which Israel finds herself]. This is the destiny 
of a democracy—it does not see all means as acceptable, and the 
ways of its enemies are not always open before it. A democracy 
must sometimes fight with one hand tied behind its back. Even so, a 
democracy has the upper hand. The rule of law and the liberty of an 
individual constitute important components in its understanding of 
security. At the end of the day, they strengthen its spirit and this 
strength allows it to overcome its difficulties.
154
 
The decision is explicitly self-conscious and reveals the Court’s 
appreciation of the tension between national security and individual rights:  
Deciding these petitions weighed heavily on this Court. True, from 
the legal perspective, the road before us is smooth. We are, 
however, part of Israeli society. Its problems are known to us and 
we live its history. We are not isolated in an ivory tower. We live 
the life of this country. We are aware of the harsh reality of 
terrorism in which we are, at times, immersed. The possibility that 
 
 
 152. Id. ¶¶ 33–38. 
 153. HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture, ¶ 39 (citing Basic Law: Human Dignity & 
Liberty). 
 154. Id. ¶ 39. 
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this decision will hamper the ability to properly deal with terrorists 
and terrorism disturbs us. We are, however, judges. We must decide 
according to the law. This is the standard that we set for ourselves. 
When we sit to judge, we ourselves are judged. Therefore, in 
deciding the law, we must act according to our purest conscience.
155
 
While this decision unquestionably declares the challenged interrogation 
practices unlawful, it stops short of saying that the state could not 
authorize the practices. No such legislation has been enacted, which is not 
surprising given the Court’s strong indication that both international and 
domestic law prohibits such methods. 
C. Detention 
The United States Supreme Court has heard several cases in the post 
9/11 world, raising questions concerning the constitutionality of the 
executive’s indefinite detention of enemy combatants, the constitutionality 
of military tribunals, and the constitutionality of the suspension of habeas 
corpus. As described in Part I, the Court has found these cases to be 
justiciable and has addressed the merits, ruling in each case against the 
government but stopping short of detailing the procedures that must be 
followed. 
The first of the Guantanamo cases was Rasul v. Bush, where the Court 
ruled, on statutory grounds, that Guantanamo detainees had the right to 
challenge their detention in federal court.
156
 That same year, in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, the Court held that Congress had authorized the detention of 
enemy combatants when it passed the Authorization for the Use of 
Military Force, but that individuals so detained in the United States must 
be afforded due process.
157
 In determining how much process is due, the 
Court rejected the government’s argument that, given the extraordinary 
interests at stake, the Court should defer to the military. The Court 
responded as follows: 
We necessarily reject the Government's assertion that separation of 
powers principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the 
courts in such circumstances. Indeed, the position that the courts 
must forgo any examination of the individual case and focus 
exclusively on the legality of the broader detention scheme cannot 
 
 
 155. Id. ¶ 40. 
 156. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 157. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
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be mandated by any reasonable view of separation of powers, as 
this approach serves only to condense power into a single branch of 
government. We have long since made clear that a state of war is 
not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of 
the Nation's citizens. Whatever power the United States 
Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other 
nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most 
assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual 
liberties are at stake.
158
 
In order to determine how much process is due, the Court used the familiar 
Mathews v. Eldridge three part balancing test, which weighs the plaintiff’s 
interests, the government’s interests, and the risk of erroneous 
deprivations.
159
 The Court found that the plaintiff’s interests were 
substantial—“the most elemental of liberty interests—the interest of being 
free from physical detention;” the government’s interests were weighty; 
and the risk of erroneous determinations was substantial and real.
160
 The 
Court stated: 
Striking the proper constitutional balance here is of great 
importance to the Nation during this period of ongoing combat. But 
it is equally vital that our calculus not give short shrift to the values 
that this country holds dear or to the privilege that is American 
citizenship. It is during our most challenging and uncertain 
moments that our Nation’s commitment to due process is most 
severely tested; and it is in those times that we must preserve our 
commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad.
161
 
The Court thus held that “a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his 
classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual 
basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the 
Government’s factual assertion before a neutral decisionmaker.”162 But the 
Court stopped short of prescribing the details of the hearing. Indeed, the 
Court noted that the proceedings “may be tailored to alleviate their 
uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military 
conflict.”163 Thus, “exigencies of the circumstances” may warrant the 
 
 
 158. Id. at 535–36. 
 159. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 160. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529. 
 161. Id. at 532. 
 162. Id. at 533. 
 163. Id.  
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admissibility of hearsay and the use of presumptions in favor of the 
government’s evidence so long as the detainee retained the opportunity to 
rebut that evidence.
164
 
Among the most historic of the Guantanamo cases was the Court’s 
decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which challenged the constitutionality of 
military tribunals.
165
 In a decision that has been compared to Nixon’s 
defeat in the Watergate tapes case and Truman’s defeat in the steel seizure 
case,
166
 the Court held that the military tribunals created by presidential 
order were not authorized by Congress and violated the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions.
167
 Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions requires humane treatment of captured combatants and 
prohibits trials except by “a regularly constituted court affording all the 
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
people.”168 The military tribunals were inconsistent with Article 3 because 
the detainee was not entitled to see the evidence; hearsay evidence and 
evidence obtained through coercion was admissible; and a two-thirds vote 
was sufficient for conviction.
169
 
The Court also held that the Detainee Treatment Act, which purported 
to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to entertain habeas corpus 
petitions by Guantanamo detainees, applied only prospectively and thus 
did not prevent the Court from hearing Hamdan’s challenge.170 In 
response, Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which 
denies habeas to all non-citizens held as enemy combatants.
171
 The 
constitutionality of that Act was challenged in Boumediene v. Bush.
172
 The 
Supreme Court originally denied certiorari, leaving the D.C. Circuit’s 
decision upholding the Military Commissions Act intact. But after 
 
 
 164. Id. at 534. 
 165. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 166. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5–3, Broadly Reject Bush Plan to Try Detainees, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 20, 2006, at A1 (comparing Hamdan to United States v. Richard M. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 
(1974) and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)). Ms. Greenhouse 
described Hamdan “as a sweeping and categorical defeat for the administration” and “a defining 
moment in the ever-shifting balance of power among branches of government.” Walter Dellinger, a 
former Solicitor General, characterized Hamdan as “simply the most important decision on 
presidential power and the rule of law ever. Ever.” Walter Dellinger, The Most Important decision on 
Presidential Power Ever, SLATE (June 29, 2006), http://www.slate.com/id/2144476/entry/2144825/. 
 167. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 594, 613–24. 
 168. Id. at 631–32. 
 169. Id. at 634. 
 170. See id. at 576–84. 
 171. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/PL-109-366.pdf. 
 172. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).  
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revelations about the tribunals operating as kangaroo courts, the Court 
took the unusual step of reconsidering and agreed to decide the question of 
whether Section 7 of the Military Commissions Act is an unconstitutional 
suspension of habeas corpus.
173
 
The Court rejected the government’s argument that the case presented a 
non-justiciable political question. Citing Marbury v. Madison,
174
 the Court 
forcefully stated: 
Our basic charter cannot be contracted away like this. . . . 
Abstaining from questions involving formal sovereignty and 
territorial governance is one thing. To hold the political branches 
have the power to switch the Constitution on or off at will is quite 
another. The former position reflects this Court’s recognition that 
certain matters requiring political judgments are best left to the 
political branches. The latter would permit a striking anomaly in our 
tripartite system of government, leading to a regime in which 
Congress and the President, not this Court, say “what the law is.”175 
Turning to the merits, the Court first decided that constitutional rights 
extend to those held in Guantanamo and rejected the government’s 
argument that the Constitution stops where de jure sovereignty ends, 
finding that the United States has complete jurisdiction and control over 
Guantanamo and thus exercises de facto sovereignty. A sovereignty-based 
test would create serious separation of powers problems because 
“surrendering formal sovereignty over an unincorporated territory” while 
retaining total control over the territory would permit “the political 
branches to govern without legal constraint.”176 
The Court next decided that the Suspension Clause of Article I, Section 
9, Clause 2, which prohibits the suspension of habeas corpus except “in 
cases of rebellion or invasion,” has full effect at Guantanamo177 and that 
 
 
 173. Benjamin Wittes & Hannah Neprash, The Story of the Guantanamo Cases: Habeas Corpus, 
the Reach of the Court, and the War on Terror, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 513, 548 (Michael 
C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009). 
 174. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 175. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765. 
 176. Id. at 764–65. 
 177. Id. at 771, 832. The Court analyzed three factors in reaching this decision: “(1) the 
citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that status 
determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; 
and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.” Id. at 766. 
Applying those factors, the Court found: (1) the detainees’ status is in dispute and they are only able to 
contest via a Combatant Status Review Tribunal offering very limited protections; (2) the site of 
detention is technically outside US sovereignty but within US control; and (3) while habeas 
proceedings “may require an expenditure of funds” and “may divert the attention of military 
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the alternative procedures contained in the Detainee Treatment Act do not 
provide an adequate substitute for habeas corpus.
178
 The defects in the 
alternative procedure included lack of assistance of counsel, constraints 
upon the detainee’s ability to rebut the factual basis for the government’s 
assertion that he is an enemy combatant, the admission of hearsay 
evidence, and the limited scope of circuit court review.
179
 In reaching this 
result, the Court stopped short of prescribing what due process requires 
but was quite clear in rejecting the government’s argument about the need 
to defer to the political branches when it comes to determining the 
availability of habeas corpus: 
Our opinion does not undermine the Executive’s powers as 
Commander in Chief. On the contrary, the exercise of those powers 
is vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by the Judicial Branch. 
Within the Constitution’s separation-of-powers structure, few 
exercises of judicial power are as legitimate or as necessary as the 
responsibility to hear challenges to the authority of the Executive to 
imprison a person. Some of these petitioners have been in custody 
for six years with no definitive judicial determination as to the 
legality of their detention. Their access to the writ is a necessity to 
determine the lawfulness of their status, even if, in the end, they do 
not obtain the relief they seek.
180
 
The Court concluded its opinion by noting, “The laws and Constitution are 
designed to survive and remain in force in extraordinary times. Liberty 
and security can be reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled 
within the framework of the law. The Framers decided that habeas corpus, 
a right of first importance, must be a part of that framework, a part of that 
law.”181 In other words, the Constitution must be complied with, even 
during the war on terrorism.  
Cases challenging the detention of terrorism suspects have also reached 
the Israeli Supreme Court. Two of those cases resulted from Operation 
Defensive Wall, which began in March 2002 in response to a dramatic 
escalation of terrorist activities originating in the West Bank.
182
 Israeli 
 
 
personnel,” “the Government presents no credible arguments that the military mission at Guantanamo 
would be compromised if habeas corpus courts had jurisdiction to hear the detainees’ claim.” Id. at 
766–69. 
 178. Id. at 792. 
 179. Id. at 783–92. 
 180. Id. at 797. 
 181. Id. at 798. 
 182. See HCJ 3278/02 The Center for Defense of the Individual v. Commander of the IDF Forces 
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defense forces arrested and detained 6000 Palestinians in the West 
Bank.
183
 The detainees were originally held in temporary detention 
facilities with those suspected of more serious offenses transferred to Ofer 
Camp for more intensive interrogation. Their detention resulted in two 
judgments of the Supreme Court: one relating to conditions at the 
detention facilities and the other addressing the length of detention without 
interrogation, court hearing, or access to legal counsel.
184
 
In The Center for Defense of the Individual v. Commander of the IDF 
Forces in the West Bank, petitioners challenged the conditions at the two 
camps.
185
 At the temporary camp, detainees were forced to sit on the 
ground in uncomfortable positions for long periods of time with their 
hands roughly handcuffed and their eyes covered. The detainees were 
exposed to the weather and unable to sleep, deprived of sustenance, not 
regularly allowed to go to the bathroom, and subject to physical and verbal 
abuse if they moved.
186
 The state conceded that these temporary facilities 
were inadequate to handle the number of detainees and that the use of 
handcuffs and abuse constituted prohibited conduct.
187
 
Detainees suspected of serious offenses were brought to Camp Ofer 
after interrogation at the temporary camp. Conditions at Camp Ofer 
included overcrowding, tents that did not protect against the weather, 
insufficient mattresses and blankets, inadequate food and clothing, 
inadequate bathroom facilities, no hot water, and no medical treatment 
except painkillers.
188
 The state conceded that the conditions at Camp Ofer 
were inadequate but argued that all the problems had been resolved by the 
construction of new shelters and detention centers.
189
 
The Court applied the humanitarian principles of customary 
international law
190
 and the Fourth Geneva Convention,
191
 as well as the 
 
 
in the West Bank [2002] slip op. (Isr.), available at http://www.hamoked.org/items/1030_eng.pdf 
(unofficial version). “Approximately one hundred and twenty Israeli civilians were killed and 
hundreds were wounded.” Id. ¶ 1. 
 183. Id. ¶ 2. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. ¶¶ 2, 3. 
 186. Id. ¶ 3. 
 187. Id. ¶¶ 6, 7. 
 188. Id. ¶ 4. 
 189. Id. ¶¶ 9–11. 
 190. See id. ¶ 23. The Court also relied on Article 10 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, which reflects customary international law, and which requires that detainees be 
treated humanely and in recognition of their human dignity, a requirement followed by Israel. Id. ¶ 24. 
 191. See id. ¶ 23. The Fourth Geneva Convention contains both general directives regarding 
humane treatment and specific directives regarding conditions of confinement applicable to detainees. 
The Convention requires that “detention conditions must preserve the health and personal hygiene of 
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principles of domestic administrative law, which require the army to act 
reasonably and proportionately. The principles of international law that 
require treating prisoners with human dignity and with respect apply to 
Israel’s treatment of detainees: 
Any person in Israel who has been sentenced to imprisonment, or 
lawfully detained, is entitled to be held under humane and civilized 
conditions. It is not significant that this right has yet to be explicitly 
stated in legislation; this is one of the fundamental human rights, 
and in a law-abiding democratic state it is so self-evident that it 
needs not be written or legislated.
192
 
Although “the nature of detention necessitates the denial of liberty” it 
“does not justify the violation of human dignity”: 
Even those suspected of terrorist activity of the worst kind are 
entitled to conditions of detention which satisfy minimal standards 
of humane treatment and ensure basic human necessities. How 
could we consider ourselves civilized if we did not guarantee 
civilized standards to those in our custody? Such is the duty of the 
commander of the area under international law, and such is his duty 
under our administrative law. Such is the duty of the Israeli 
government, in accord with its fundamental character: Jewish, 
democratic and humane.
193
 
The Court ultimately concluded that the conditions at the temporary camp 
failed to meet the minimal standards required by both international law 
and domestic administrative law.
194
 The violations included: rough 
handcuffing, keeping detainees outside and exposed to weather, 
inadequate access to bathrooms, and not documenting confiscated 
possessions.
195
 The Court found that these conditions were not justified by 
exigencies since the operation was planned well in advance. The Court 
reached the same conclusion with respect to conditions at Camp Ofer. The 
 
 
detainees,” protect them from weather, be properly lit and heated, provide sufficiently spacious and 
ventilated sleeping areas (one detainee to a bed), have clean and hygienic bathrooms with soap and 
water and access to showers, provide daily nourishment and drinking water, allow detainees to prepare 
their own food, provide clothing, provide unlimited access to medical care and “medical inspections at 
least once a month,” offer at least one hour of physical exercise, and provide for the return of all 
belongings taken. Id. ¶ 25 (citing Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War-1949, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 28 [hereinafter Geneva Convention]). 
 192. HCJ 3278/02 The Center for Defense of the Individual slip op., ¶ 24. 
 193. Id. ¶ 24. 
 194. Id. ¶ 26. 
 195. Id. 
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level of overcrowding at this facility was violative of the minimal 
standards required by law.
196
 It was only at the third stage of detention that 
the Court found the conditions not only met but exceeded legal 
requirements with two minor exceptions. The first failure related to the 
lack of tables for meals (“detainees are not animals and should not be 
forced to eat on the ground”)197 and the second related to the failure to 
provide books, newspapers, and games.
198
 
Despite these findings, the Court denied the petitions. A reader of the 
judgment cannot help but be struck by the seeming anomaly of finding 
violations of law yet denying relief. Apparently, the explanation is that by 
the time of the judgment, conditions had improved substantially; thus, 
relief was no longer warranted. As Part IV of this Article argues, this may 
well be an example of the usefulness and importance of judicial review. In 
other words, the willingness of the Court to hear the case may well prompt 
remedial action that would not otherwise occur. 
The second of the two detention cases involving Operation Defensive 
Wall, Marab v. IDF Commander in the West Bank, challenged the order 
by which thousands of detainees were held without judicial proceedings.
199
 
Order 1500 authorized detention for up to eighteen days without a judicial 
order and without the opportunity to see a lawyer.
200
 Even after the 
expiration of the eighteen day period, a detainee could be denied a lawyer 
upon a determination that “such is necessary for the security of the area or 
for the benefit of the investigation.”201 
 
 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. ¶ 28. 
 198. Id. The Court renewed a recommendation made in a previous case for the establishment of a 
permanent advisory committee to conduct regular inspections. The committee would be chaired by a 
senior military judge and consist of experts in medicine, psychology, and prison management. The 
Court requests “that this recommendation be brought to the attention of the military’s Chief of Staff. 
We are confident that he will act to ensure its implementation.” Id. ¶ 29 (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted). The creation of this tribunal, however, would not obviate the necessity for judicial review. 
“[C]onstant supervision and inspection are not substitutes for detainee petitions and judicial review. 
These other options are available to detainees in Israel.” Id. However, creation of a tribunal could 
provide a mechanism for alternative relief “which would justify limiting the judicial review of this 
Court to those cases where the situation has not been resolved through these other methods.” Id. ¶ 30. 
 199. HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. IDF Commander in the West Bank slip op. [July 28, 2002] (Isr.). 
Prior to Operation Defensive Wall, existing military law allowed for a person to be detained for up to 
eight days without appearing before a judge. Id. ¶ 29. 
 200. Id. ¶ 3. 
 201. Id. Order 1500 was extended by Order 1505, which shortened the period of detention from 
eighteen to twelve days and shortened the period in which the detainee cold be prevented from seeing 
a lawyer from eighteen days to four, although the head of investigation could approve extensions of 
fifteen days. Id. ¶ 6. Many detainees were not brought before a judge even after the expiration of the 
eighteen day period. An additional order was issued, Order 1502, providing that such detainees should 
be brought before a judge as soon as possible and no later than May 10, and any detainee not brought 
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Petitioner argued that the challenged order violated both domestic and 
international law. The order was inconsistent with Basic Law, Human 
Dignity and Liberty because it permitted “mass detentions without the 
individual examination,” without clear grounds, and without judicial 
review.
202
 The order was inconsistent with international humanitarian and 
human rights law because, although the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the Geneva Convention recognize regular criminal and 
preventive detention, they do not recognize “prolonged mass detention for 
the purpose of screening the detainees.”203  
The state argued that its military operation had been planned in great 
haste and that the General Security Service could not have been prepared 
for the overwhelming number of detainees resulting from Operation 
Defensive Wall. The state pointed to the difficulty in distinguishing 
terrorists from civilians and of the need to prohibit meetings with lawyers 
in order to prevent messages from being passed.
204
 The state urged the 
Court to withhold any decision until it could hear classified data 
describing the objective constraints that led to the issuance of the 
challenged orders.
205
 
The Court separately analyzed four distinct issues, ruling for the state 
on two claims and for petitioner on the remaining claims, but staying its 
order for six months on the claims on which petitioner prevailed.  
The first issue concerned the authority to detain. The Court concluded 
that both domestic and international law recognize the authority to detain 
so long as the detention is for investigative purposes, the detaining 
authority has an evidentiary basis to believe the detainee endangers public 
security, and the detention represents a balance between national security 
and the liberty of the individual.
206
 Finding these requirements satisfied, 
primarily because the challenged orders require cause before an individual 
can be detained, the Court rejected petitioner’s claim that the military 
commander had no authority to detain. 
207
  
 
 
before a judge by that time would be released. Id. ¶ 4. Order 1518 further shortened the period during 
which meetings with lawyers could be prevented from four to two days and provided the detainee an 
“opportunity to voice his claims ‘no later than within four days of his detention.’” Id. ¶ 17. 
 202. Id. ¶ 8. 
 203. Id. ¶¶ 8–9. 
 204. Id. ¶¶ 11–12. 
 205. Id. ¶ 17. 
 206. Id. ¶¶ 18–21. Article 9.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides 
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.” Israeli law is consistent with international 
law on this issue: “Man’s inherent liberty is at the foundation of the Jewish and democratic values of 
the State of Israel.” Id. ¶¶ 19–20. 
 207. Id. ¶ 23 
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The Court also ruled against the petitioners on their challenge to being 
prevented from meeting with their lawyers for periods of up to thirty-four 
days.
208
 This result is hard to square with the Court’s analysis of the 
“normative framework” provided under both domestic and international 
law, which supports the principle that detainees and attorneys should be 
able to meet, a principle that “stems from every person’s right to personal 
liberty.”209 While the right is not absolute, it can only be prevented when 
required by “significant security considerations,” and “advancing the 
investigation is not a sufficient reason to prevent the meeting.”210 Rather, 
“‘[t]he focus is on the damage that may be caused to national security if 
the meeting with the lawyer is not prevented’” as, for example, where 
“there is suspicion that ‘the lives of the combat forces will be endangered 
due to opportunities to pass messages out of the facility.’”211 Without 
explanation, the Court nevertheless concludes that “there are no flaws” in 
the challenged orders, preventing detainees from meeting with lawyers for 
over a month.
212
  
Petitioners fared better on their claim relating to detention without 
judicial intervention. Under the challenged orders, some detainees had 
been held for forty-two days without being brought before a judge. 
“Judicial review is the line of defense for liberty, and it must be preserved 
beyond all else.”213 “Judicial intervention . . . is essential to the principle of 
rule of law. It guarantees the preservation of the delicate balance between 
individual liberty and public safety . . . .”214 The Court relied on customary 
international law, which establishes the general principle that detainees 
should promptly be brought before a judge.
215
 
 
 
 208. See id. ¶¶ 39–40. Order 1500 imposed an eighteen-day waiting period which could be 
extended for fifteen days, thus totaling delays of up to thirty-three days. Order 1505 shortened the 
original waiting period to four days but permitted two extensions for fifteen days each, thus totaling 
delays of up to thirty-four days. Order 1518 reduced the initial period to two days but permitted two 
extensions of fifteen days each, thus totaling delays of thirty-two days. Id. ¶¶ 38–40. 
 209. Id. ¶ 43. The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not contain an explicit provision, 
but Principle 18.1 requires a detainee to be able to communicate and consult with legal counsel subject 
to exceptional circumstances “to maintain security and good order.” Id. ¶ 41. The Fourth Geneva 
Convention also does not explicitly deal with meetings with a lawyer although Article 113 talks about 
the detaining authority permitting execution of documents by allowing detainees to consult with a 
lawyer subject to security needs. Id. ¶ 42. 
 210. Id. ¶ 45. 
 211. Id. (quoting HCJ 4965/94 Kahalani v. Minister of Police (unreported decision) (Isr.)). 
 212. Id. ¶ 45. 
 213. Id. ¶ 26 (quoting HCJ 2320/98 El-Amla v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria 52(3) PD 
346, 350 [1998] (Isr.)). 
 214. Id. ¶ 26. 
 215. Id. ¶ 27. 
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In determining whether a detention without judicial intervention for 
eighteen (or twelve) days is legal, “the special circumstances of the 
detention must be taken into account.”216 The question is “where a 
detainee is in a detention facility which allows for carrying out the initial 
investigation, what is the timeframe available to investigators for carrying 
out the initial investigation without judicial intervention?”217 The Court 
concluded that eighteen (and twelve) days is too long and fails to comport 
with both international and domestic law: 
The accepted approach is that judicial review is an integral part of 
the detention process. Judicial review is not “external” to the 
detention. It is an inseparable part of the development of the 
detention itself. At the basis of this approach lies a constitutional 
perspective which considers judicial review of detention 
proceedings essential for the protection of individual liberty. Thus, 
the detainee need not “appeal” his detention before a judge. 
Appearing before a judge is an “internal” part of the detention 
process. The judge does not ask himself whether a reasonable police 
officer would have been permitted to carry out the detention. The 
judge asks himself whether, in his opinion, there are sufficient 
investigative materials to support the continuation of the 
detention.
218
  
Having found that the challenged orders providing for an eighteen or 
twelve day detention period without judicial review are unlawful, the 
Court nevertheless refuses to proscribe a substitute time. Instead, 
exhibiting its consistent pattern of not substituting its judgment for that of 
the ground commanders, the Court calls on the military commander to 
establish a substitute period and stays its decision for six months to permit 
“the reorganization required by both international and internal law.”219 
Petitioners met the same fate with respect to the last claim challenging 
detentions without investigations. Order 1500 authorized detention 
without investigation for eight days, although a subsequent order 
shortened this period to four days. The Court rejected the state’s argument 
that given the number of detainees, it simply did not have enough 
investigators to do this more quickly. “A society which desires both 
security and individual liberty must pay the price. The mere lack of 
 
 
 216. Id. ¶ 30. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. ¶ 32. 
 219. Id. ¶ 36. 
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investigators cannot justify neglecting to investigate.”220 However, this 
portion of the decision was also stayed for six months to enable the state to 
make substitute arrangements in conformity with international and Israeli 
law.
221
 
This decision reflects a recurring pattern in a surprising number of 
Israeli Supreme Court terrorism decisions. The opinion, like many others, 
emphasizes the importance of judicial review and contains almost 
reverential reference to the dictates of international law, which require 
protection of human rights and which correspond to the basic values of 
Israel’s democracy. That language, however, is typically followed by 
either “petition denied” or, when the petition is granted, a stay of the 
decision for a substantial period of time. Upon closer examination, the 
“petition denied” cases are often cases where the party has already 
received most of the requested relief. This practice of denying the petition 
after ensuring that relief has been granted has been referred to as 
“favorable dismissals.”222 
The Supreme Court has also heard challenges to the administrative 
detention of specific individuals. In A v. Commander of IDF Forces in 
Judea and Samaria, a member of Hamas who had been arrested on his 
way to commit a suicide bombing was detained for four years.
223
 He 
petitioned the Supreme Court for release and argued that his continued 
detention was based on dated intelligence information.
224
 The Court 
emphasized that administrative detention is preventive, not punitive; that 
administrative detention cannot continue indefinitely; and that the longer 
the period of detention, the weightier the burden on the state.
225
 Despite 
that framework, the Court upheld petitioner’s continued detention, finding 
that the military commander had properly balanced the infringement of 
liberty against the danger to the public and that releasing him would be 
equivalent to releasing a “‘tickingbomb.’”226 In reaching this result, the 
Court exhibited considerable deference to the military commander and 
noted that the art of striking the proper balance is not easy, but “[t]his art 
is the responsibility of the military commander. The discretion on the 
 
 
 220. Id. ¶¶ 47–48. 
 221. Id. ¶ 49. 
 222. Davidov & Reichman, supra note 104, at 946–47. 
 223. See HCJ 11026/05 A v. Commander of IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria [Dec. 5, 2005] 
(Isr.). 
 224. Id. ¶ 4. 
 225. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. 
 226. Id. ¶¶ 5–9. 
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subject is his.”227 What might change warranting his release? Either a 
change in the present security situation or a change in his intentions, 
although it is unclear from the opinion what evidence the Military 
Commander would credit as establishing a change in intentions.
228
 
A more recent detention case challenged the Internment of Unlawful 
Combatants Law, which authorized administrative detention. Petitioners in 
A. v. State of Israel were members of Hezbollah operating in the Gaza 
Strip who challenged their own confinement and the overall legality of 
administrative detention.
229
 In a lengthy opinion that relied, in part, on 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
230
 the Court upheld the Internment of Unlawful 
Combatants Law, finding it consistent with international law and with 
Israel’s Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The Court’s decision 
emphasized that the law provided for periodic judicial review of all 
internment decisions.
231
  
D. Other 
1. House Demolitions 
In Janimat v. IDF Military Commander,
232
 the Israeli Supreme Court 
upheld the use of a house demolition order following the suicide bombing 
of Tel Aviv’s Apropro Café, which killed three and wounded dozens. The 
bomber’s house, located in the West Bank near Hebron, was currently 
occupied by the bomber’s wife and four children who lived on the second 
floor of the apartment building.
233
  
In a surprisingly short opinion, the Court upheld the demolition order, 
finding that demolition is not a punitive measure but rather a deterrent. 
Moreover, the power to order demolition derives from legislation during 
the period of the British mandate which was integrated into Israeli law
234
 
and which has repeatedly been upheld.  
 
 
 227. Id. ¶ 5. 
 228. Id. ¶ 9. 
 229. CrimA (TA) 6659/06 A v. State of Israel, 47 I.L.M. 768, 771 [2008] (Isr.). 
 230. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 231. HCJ 11026/05 A v. Commander of IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria, ¶ 47. 
 232. HCJ 2006/97 Janimat v. Cent. Commander, IsrSC 51(2) 651 [1997] (Isr.), available at 
http://www.hamoked.org/images/4980_eng.pdf (unofficial version). 
 233. The bomber’s brother lived in the adjacent apartment. The Court determined that the planned 
demolition would not damage the adjacent apartment or the other floors in the building. Id. ¶ 3. 
 234. Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, Palestine Gazette (No. 1442), Reg. 119(2), at 1089 
(Supp. II Sept. 27, 1945). 
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Justice Cheshin filed a dissenting opinion in which he relied on the 
Torah to conclude that demolishing the house is punishing the innocent 
family: 
Every man must pay for his own crimes. In the words of the 
Prophets:  
 “The soul that sins, it shall die. The son shall not bear the 
iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the 
son; the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the 
wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him. (Ezekial 18:20) 
 One should punish only cautiously, and one should strike the 
sinner himself alone. This is the Jewish way as prescribed in the 
Law of Moses:  
 “The fathers shall not be put to death for their children, nor the 
children be put to death for the fathers; but every man shall be put 
to death for his own sin.” (II Kings 14:6)235 
Justice Cheshin emphasized that no one disputed that the wife and children 
of the suicide bomber played no role in the attack and indeed did not even 
know of the planned attack. In concluding that the petition should be 
granted preventing the house demolition, Justice Cheshin states: “I 
deliberated long and hard until I reached this conclusion. This is the Torah 
that I learned from my teachers, and this is the doctrine of law that I have 
in my hands. I can rule no other way.”236 
Following the decision, the government conducted hundreds of house 
demolitions, which did not succeed in stopping terrorist attacks. A 2005 
Commission concluded that house demolitions had not acted as a deterrent 
and recommended that the practice be discontinued. Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharron accepted the recommendation.
237
 
Upon retirement, Justice Barak, who had authored the majority 
opinion, expressed regret for the decision saying that house demolitions 
“are unworthy and of no use.”238 
 
 
 235. Janimat, IsrSC 51(2) 651 (Chesin, M., dissenting). 
 236. Id. ¶ 23. 
 237. Greg Myer, Israel Halts Decades-Old Practice of Demolishing Militants’ Homes, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 14, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/18/international/middleeast/18mideast.html? 
pagewanted=print&position=. 
 238. Tomer Zarchin, Former Chief Justice Barak Regrets House Demolitions, HAARETZ (May 27, 
2009), http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/former-chief-justice-barak-regrets-house-demolit 
ions-1.276763. 
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2. Separation Fence 
The Court has heard and decided many challenges to various aspects of 
the highly controversial separation fence, but the case establishing the 
Court’s analytic framework to these challenges is Beit Sourik Village 
Council v. Gov’t of Israel.239 In fact, the Court put on hold all of “The 
Fence Cases” pending resolution of Beit Sourik.240 
The separation fence, alternatively called a wall or barrier or seam line 
obstacle, was built to prevent the penetration of terrorists into Israel and 
the escalating violence that followed the failure of the Camp David talks 
in 2000.
241
 The Commander of IDF forces issued an order for land in the 
West Bank to be seized to erect the separation fence.
242
 The order required 
compensation to the landowner whose land was seized.
243
 The order also 
required notice to the public, a survey conducted with input from local 
residents, and an opportunity for appeal to the military commander 
followed by appeal to the High Court of Justice.
244
 
The question before the Court in Beit Sourik was whether the seizure 
was unlawful, given the hardships it created on local residents.
245
 The 
hardships included loss of livelihood because the fence made cultivation 
of agricultural land impossible, restriction of freedom of movement 
affecting access to medical care and access to schools, restriction of access 
to water wells affecting crops and shepherding, and uprooting of tens of 
thousands of olive and fruit trees.
246
 
Petitioners argued that the seizure was contrary to Israeli administrative 
law and international public law for three distinct reasons. First, 
petitioners argued that military necessity did not justify the seizure whose 
real objective was annexation of land in violation of international law.
247
 
Second, petitioners argued that the procedures used to determine the 
location of the fence were themselves illegal because the landowners were 
not given a meaningful opportunity to participate in the process.
248
 Third, 
petitioners argued that the location of the fence violated the fundamental 
 
 
 239. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Gov’t of Israel 58(5) PD 807 [2004] (Isr.).  
 240. Id. ¶ 3. 
 241. Id. ¶ 1–3. From September 2000 through April 2004, there were reportedly 780 attacks, 
killing 900 and injuring over 6000 Israelis. Id. 
 242. Id. ¶ 8. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id.  
 245. Id. ¶ 11. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. ¶ 10. 
 248. Id. 
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rights of local inhabitants, including the right to property, freedom of 
movement, livelihood, freedom of occupation, educational opportunities, 
and freedom of religion.
249
 Petitioners argued that given these harms, the 
route of the fence violated the proportionality requirement and constituted 
collective punishment.
250
 
The state argued that the fence was justified by compelling security 
needs in order to protect the lives of Israelis, and that efforts had been 
made to minimize hardship to local residents.
251
 Thus, wherever possible, 
trees and buildings were moved and not destroyed and where damage 
could not be avoided, compensation was paid. Second, the state argued 
that the process of seizure was lawful because all orders of seizure were 
brought to the attention of petitioners who were given the opportunity to 
participate in the surveys and, if dissatisfied, appeal.
252
 Finally, the state 
justified its seizure orders based on the natural right of the state to defend 
itself against threats from outside the state’s borders. Security officers 
have power to seize land for combat purposes by the laws of belligerent 
occupation and these seizures were carried out with due regard for 
minimizing unnecessary injury to local inhabitants.
253
  
The Court held hearings, sometimes on a daily basis, in an 
unsuccessful race to get the decision out before the International Court of 
Justice rendered its judgment in a case being simultaneously heard that 
challenged the overall legality of the fence. The hearings resulted in 
several modifications and changes to the route.
254
  
Before addressing the specific issues, the Court provided the 
framework for its decision: that Israel holds the area in belligerent 
occupation, meaning that the area is subject to the control of the military 
commander whose authority is subject to the humanitarian rules of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention regarding the protection of civilians in time of 
war.
255
 Principles of Israeli administrative law also apply to the military 
commander, including the norms of substantive and procedural fairness 
and the norm of proportionality. “Every Israeli soldier carries, in his pack, 
 
 
 249. Id. ¶ 11. 
 250. Id.  
 251. Id. ¶¶ 12–13. 
 252. Id. ¶ 14. 
 253. Id. ¶ 15. 
 254. The Council for Peace and Security, a nonpartisan organization that had been an early 
champion of the fence, raised security questions about some aspects of the route and suggested 
alterations. The state accepted some but rejected others. Id. ¶¶ 16–22. 
 255. Id. ¶ 23. 
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the provisions of public international law regarding the laws of war and 
the basic provisions of Israeli administrative law.”256 
The three issues the Court analyzed were whether the military 
commander in the West Bank was authorized to construct the separation 
fence, whether the procedures used to seize the land were lawful, and 
whether the location and route of the fence were legal. With respect to the 
first issue, the Court acknowledged that the separation fence would be 
illegal if it were motivated by a desire to annex territory or to draw a 
political border.
257
 The military commander has no authority to act 
generally for the good of Israel; his authority is limited to acting for 
military, not political, reasons.
258
 The Court concluded that the fence was 
motivated by security concerns, not political objectives; it was designed to 
prevent terrorist attacks, not to set a border.
259
 The Court also found no 
defect in the process for seizing the land.
260
  
As to the route of the separation fence, the Court concluded that the 
military commander had failed to satisfy the proportionality requirement. 
The military commander’s authority to maintain security in the area and to 
protect the security of the country must be balanced against the rights, 
needs and interests of the local population.
261
 “The law of war usually 
creates a delicate balance between two poles: military necessity on one 
hand, and humanitarian considerations on the other.”262 This balancing is 
reflected in the Fourth Geneva Convention, which imposes both negative 
and positive obligations: that the military commander “refrain from 
actions that injure local inhabitants” (“negative obligation”), and that the 
military commander “take action to ensure that local inhabitants shall not 
be injured” (“positive obligation”).263 
The Court explained that proportionality is a fundamental principle of 
international law and Israeli administrative law.
264
 The liberty of the local 
population can be restricted only on condition that the restriction is 
 
 
 256. Id. ¶ 24. (internal citation omitted). 
 257. Id. ¶ 27 (citing HCJ 390/79 Duikat v. The Government of Israel 34(1) PD 25 [1979] (Isr.)). 
The Duikat case had rejected the legality of seizing land based on the Zionist perspective of settling 
the entire land of Israel. 
 258. Id. ¶¶ 26–27. The military commander is authorized by international law applicable to 
belligerent occupation to take possession of land if necessary for the needs of the army, assuming 
compensation is paid. Id. ¶ 32. 
 259. Id. ¶ 28.  
 260. Id. ¶ 32. 
 261. Id. ¶ 34. 
 262. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 263. Id. ¶ 35. 
 264. Proportionality is a constitutional principle found in Article 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity 
and Freedom and represents one of the basic values of Israeli administrative law. Id. ¶ 38. 
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proportionate. This principle of proportionality applies to every act of 
Israeli administrative authorities including the military commander’s 
authority pursuant to the law of belligerent occupation.
265
 In order to 
satisfy the principle of proportionality, three elements must be met. First, 
the objective must be rationally related to the means.
266
 In other words, 
there must be a rational connection between the route of the fence and the 
goal of security. Second, the means used must injure the individual to the 
least extent possible.
267
 In other words, among the various routes that 
would achieve the goal, the chosen one must be the least injurious. Third, 
the damage caused to the individual by the means used must be of proper 
proportion to the gain brought about by that means.
268
 In other words, the 
route cannot injure the local inhabitants to such an extent that it is 
disproportionate to the security benefit. Proportionality will not be met if 
there is an alternate route that creates a smaller security advantage than the 
chosen route but causes significantly less damage.
269
 
The Court then proceeded to determine whether the chosen route for 
the fence satisfied the three-part proportionality test. In applying that test, 
the Court applied an objective standard, not based on the military 
commander’s belief or whether or not he acted in good faith. Rather, the 
question is a legal issue, “the expertise for which is held by the Court.”270 
Because proportionality varies according to local conditions, the Court 
separately analyzed each challenged portion of the route, although 
consistently deferred to the military commander in the face of conflicting 
military opinions regarding security objectives.
271
 Applying the three-part 
test to a ten kilometer portion of the fence in a mountain area just west of 
Jerusalem, the Court concluded that: (1) there is a rational connection 
between the security objective and the route; (2) although the proposed 
alternative route would be less injurious, it would not serve security 
objectives as well; but (3) utilizing a cost/benefit analysis, the damage 
caused to the local population is disproportionate to the security 
benefits.
272
 The route “injures the local inhabitants in a severe and acute 
way, while violating their rights under humanitarian international law.”273 
 
 
 265. Id. ¶ 38. The Court cited extensive case law establishing that proportionality limits the power 
of the military commander. Id. ¶ 39. 
 266. Id. ¶ 41. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. ¶¶ 41–44. 
 270. Id. ¶ 48. 
 271. Id. ¶ 49. 
 272. Id. ¶¶ 59–61. 
 273. Id. ¶ 60. The Court found that the fence severely violates the local inhabitants’ right of 
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Other portions of the fence were analyzed in the same way: the first 
two subparts of the proportionality test were satisfied with the Court 
showing deference to the military commander’s views, but the third part of 
the test was not met.
274
 The Court’s overview of the issue was that the 40 
kilometers of the fence affected 35,000 local inhabitants, took up 4000 
dunams (10,000 square feet) of their lands, caused thousands of olive trees 
to be uprooted, and separated 8 villages from 30,000 dunams of their land, 
causing individual harm and harm to the fabric of life.
275
 Despite the 
military commander’s good faith, the balance struck failed the 
proportionality test, therefore necessitating a renewed examination of the 
route of the fence.
276
 
Justice Barak ends the decision with an epilogue where he 
acknowledges, as he did in the torture case, that the Court’s judgment will 
not make it easier for the state to fight terrorism. But, he concludes: 
There is no security without law. Satisfying the provisions of the 
law is an aspect of national security. . . . Only a separation fence 
built on a base of law will grant security to the state and its citizens. 
Only a separation route based on the path of law will lead the state 
to the security so yearned for.
277
 
A few months later, the Court decided another fence case in which the 
Court attempted to explain why its conclusion differed from the ICJ’s 
Advisory Opinion, which had concluded that the fence was illegal. In 
Mara’be v. Prime Minister of Israel, the Court explained that the two 
courts agreed on the normative framework, but the ICJ did not have the 
necessary facts in front of it regarding military security needs.
278
 In 
particular, the Court pointed to errors in the data relied on by the ICJ 
regarding harm to Palestinians and to the fact that the ICJ lacked the data 
to do a proper proportionality analysis which requires balancing security 
needs against impingement of rights of local inhabitants.
279
 Since the ICJ’s 
conclusion was based on an inadequate factual record, it was not res 
 
 
property and freedom of movement and severely impairs their livelihood. More than 1300 farmers 
were cut off from their land and trees which constituted their livelihood. No effort was made to offer 
the local inhabitants substitute land. The licensing scheme to use two gates was unnecessarily onerous. 
The injuries could be substantially reduced by an alternate route without sacrificing the security 
advantage. 
 274. Id. ¶¶ 71, 76, 80.  
 275. Id. ¶ 82. 
 276. Id. ¶ 85. 
 277. Id. ¶ 86. 
 278. HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel (2) IsrLR 106, ¶¶ 57, 61 [2005] (Isr.). 
 279. Id. ¶¶ 59–72. 
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judicata and did “not obligate the Supreme Court of Israel to rule that each 
and every segment of the fence violates international law.”280 
The fence that was challenged in Mara’be v. Prime Minister of Israel 
enclosed a Jewish settlement, Alfei Menashe, with a population of 5,650, 
and five Palestinian villages with a combined population of 1,200.
281
 The 
construction of the fence was defended by the need to protect Israeli 
settlers in the West Bank.
282
 Thus, the case seemingly presented a question 
as to the legality of the Jewish settlement. The Court declined to address 
that question, concluding that it could decide the legality of the fence 
without determining the legality of the settlement because the duty of the 
Military Commander is to preserve the safety of every person in the 
belligerent occupation, including the lives of settlers, whether the 
settlement is legal or not.
283
 
The Court applied the three-part proportionality test and found that the 
second part, which requires the least injurious means, was not satisfied 
because the security goals could be achieved as well by encircling the 
Jewish settlement without including the Palestinian villages.
284
 Thus, the 
Military Commander was ordered to reconsider the route so that the 
Palestinian villages would be outside of the fence.
285
 
A similar result was reached in a case where petitioners challenged a 
concrete barricade built in the south of Hebron for the ostensible purpose 
of protecting persons traveling on the adjacent road. In Mayor of Ad-
Dhahiriya v. IDF Commander in West Bank, the Court concluded that the 
least injurious means test was not satisfied because a metal barricade 
would serve the security purpose as well and would cause less harm to 
local residents because they could more easily climb over the fence and 
their livestock could pass underneath.
286
 The Military Commander was 
directed to dismantle the concrete barricade within six months of the 
Court’s decision.287 This decision was followed by a contempt of court 
 
 
 280. Id. ¶ 74. 
 281. Id. ¶ 75. 
 282. Id. ¶¶ 86–91. 
 283. Id. ¶¶ 19–23. The Court rejected an “assumption of risk” argument, which did not, in the 
Court’s opinion, override the settlers’ rights to life, dignity, and honor guaranteed in the Basic Laws. 
Id. ¶ 21. 
 284. Id. ¶¶ 113–14. 
 285. Id. 
 286. HCJ 1748/06 Mayor of Ad-Dhahiriya v. IDF Commander 3 PD 1, 163, ¶¶ 19–21 [2006] 
(Isr.), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/8B21780B-ED25-4998-AEBF-06011A59D 
528/0/FightingTerrorismwithintheLaw3.pdf (unofficial version). 
 287. Id. ¶ 22. 
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order when the state failed to comply.
288
 At the end of the six-month 
period, the state asked for a four month extension, but its submissions 
revealed that it intended to leave the concrete barricade in place and 
simply create more openings. The Court said: “We cannot accept conduct 
of this kind” and ordered the state to remove the barricade within 14 days 
and pay 30,000 shekels in legal fees.
289
 
Perhaps the best-known example of non-compliance by the state 
concerns a portion of the separation fence near the town of Bilin, just west 
of Ramallah, designed to protect a nearby Jewish settlement. In 2007, the 
Supreme Court ordered that the fence be re-routed to allow Palestinian 
villagers access to their farming land, yet four years passed before that 
order was implemented.
290
 In the intervening four years, protests were held 
every Friday, some of which escalated into violence between Palestinians 
and Israeli soldiers.
291
 
3. Early Warning Procedure 
The issue in Adalah v. GOC Central Command was the legality of an 
“early warning” procedure for soliciting the assistance of local residents in 
order to arrest suspected terrorists.
292
 The Early Warning Directive states: 
“Early Warning” is an operational procedure, employed in 
operations to arrest wanted persons, allowing solicitation of a local 
Palestinian resident’s assistance in order to minimize the danger of 
wounding innocent civilians and the wanted persons themselves 
(allowing their arrest without bloodshed). Assistance by a local 
resident is intended to grant an early warning to the residents of the 
house, in order to allow the innocent to leave the building and the 
wanted persons to turn themselves in, before it becomes necessary 
to use force, which is liable to endanger human life.
293
 
 
 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. ¶ 5. 
 290. Batsheva Sobelman, Babylon & Beyond: Observations From Iraq, Iran, Israel, The Arab 
World And Beyond, L.A. TIMES (June 26, 2011), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2011/ 
06/israel-west-bank-controversial-fence-section-re-routed-near-biliin.html. 
 291. Israel Reroutes West Bank Narrier at Bilin, ALJAZEERA (June 26, 2011), http://english 
.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/06/20116261674490276.html. 
 292. HCJ 3799/02 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. IDF Cent. 
Commander (2) IsrLR 206 [2005] (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/990/037/ 
A32/02037990.a32.pdf . 
 293. Id. ¶ 5. 
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Petitioners argued that the policy violates international humanitarian law 
and is the equivalent of using local residents as human shields, a practice 
that all parties agreed was forbidden by international law.
294
 The state 
argued that civilians were not being forced but merely solicited to issue 
the warning and that the policy helped to secure the arrest of terrorists 
while protecting innocent civilians.
295
 The Court recognized the competing 
tensions: on the one hand, the policy is designed to protect local 
inhabitants which is “a central value in the humanitarian law applicable to 
belligerent occupation.”296 But on the other hand, the policy makes use of 
local civilians in a manner that can expose them to danger, potentially 
under circumstances where consent is the result of overt or subtle 
pressure.
297
 
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the Early Warning procedure 
violates international law, which precludes the use of local civilians in the 
war effort, because a civilian’s consent cannot be assumed to reflect free 
will.
298
 Judge Cheshin concurred in the result but said the case posed an 
issue so difficult that a judge might ask why he ever chose to be a judge.
299
 
He posited a scenario where a terrorist is hiding in a house and just as the 
military is about to storm the house, the father returns.
300
 Inside the house 
is his wife and eight children.
301
 The father agrees to call his family to 
leave the house.
302
 Yet the Court’s decision prohibits the army from 
allowing the father to act to protect his family. “We thus stand before the 
following choice: being aided by the father, who will warn his family, or 
storming the house, involving mortal danger to the residents of the house 
and to the soldiers. Non-recognition of the procedure in such 
circumstances is by no means simple.”303 Yet Justice Cheshin concurs 
because in difficult situations like these, the temptation to deviate from the 
prescribed procedure may be too great, risking turning a unique exception 
into routine practice.
304
 
Justice Beinisch also wrote separately and emphasized that the Early 
Warning procedure comes much too close to what is clearly prohibited. 
 
 
 294. Id. ¶¶ 13–15. 
 295. Id. ¶¶ 16–19. 
 296. Id. ¶ 23. 
 297. Id.  
 298. Id. ¶ 24. 
 299. Id. ¶ 1 (Cheshin, J., concurring). 
 300. Id. ¶ 3 (Cheshin, J., concurring). 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. ¶ 4 (Cheshin, J., concurring). 
 304. Id. ¶ 7 (Cheshin, J., concurring). 
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She refers to “the danger of sliding into the forbidden practice” of using 
civilians as human shields.
305
 She also agrees with Justice Barak that there 
is no way to ensure voluntary consent. “When a local resident is asked by 
a military commander, accompanied by armed army forces, to assist in an 
act performed against the population to which he belongs, even if the 
request is made for a desirable objective, the resident has no real option of 
refusing the request, and therefore his consent—is not consent.”306  
Adalah v. GOC Central Command is an example of the Court refusing 
to defer to the state’s assertion of what the realities of conflict require. The 
case stands apart from those cases where, even when the Court accepted 
the petitioner’s argument, it refused to impose categorical restrictions on 
military commanders, instead giving them time to formulate new 
procedures consistent with the Court’s holding. Here, in contrast, perhaps 
because of the military’s previous practice of using civilians as human 
shields, the Court issued a blanket order forbidding any use of the Early 
Warning procedure.  
4. Deportation 
Israel’s security forces adopted a policy of “assigned residence,” 
whereby the families of suicide bombers in the West Bank were relocated 
to Gaza.
307
 This policy was part of a larger military campaign reportedly 
designed to destroy the Palestinian terrorism infrastructure and prevent 
suicide bombings.
308
 Pursuant to the policy, deportations could only be 
carried out after serious terrorist incidents and only when the family itself 
was involved in terrorist activities.
309
 The legality of the policy was 
addressed in three cases combined as Ajuri v. Commander of IDF Forces 
in West Bank and heard by an expanded panel of nine justices.
310
  
The speed with which the Court heard these cases is itself notable. The 
order directing petitioners to be sent to Gaza was signed on August 1, 
2002. Petitioners appealed to an Appeals Board, which, after several days 
of hearings, approved the validity of the orders on August 12, 2002. On 
August 13, 2002, petitioners brought their challenge to the Supreme Court 
sitting as the High Court of Justice, which immediately issued an order 
 
 
 305. Id. ¶ 4 (Beinisch, J., concurring). 
 306. Id. ¶ 5 (Beinisch, J., concurring). 
 307. HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [Sept. 3, 2002] slip op. (Isr.). 
 308. Id. ¶ 3. 
 309. Id. ¶ 5. 
 310. Id. ¶ 30. 
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preventing the forcible relocation of the petitioners to Gaza pending 
further deliberations. A hearing was held within about a week.
311
 
The Court focused on the legality of the policy under international law, 
particularly Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which authorizes 
assigned residence and creates rights for those persons relocated.
312
 Article 
78 applies to forced relocations within the territory subject to belligerent 
occupation. Thus, an initial question for the court was whether Article 78 
applied when the deportation was from the West Bank to Gaza. Petitioners 
argued that the West Bank was conquered from Jordan, whereas the Gaza 
Strip was conquered from Egypt, and thus the two territories are subject to 
separate belligerent occupations by two different military commanders.
313
 
The Court rejected the argument, finding that both areas “are part of 
mandatory Palestine . . . subject to a belligerent occupation by the State of 
Israel.”314 
The Court then upheld the area commander’s authority to deport a 
person to Gaza, but only when that person constitutes a current danger and 
when relocating that person will aid in averting the danger. The relocation 
must be necessary “for imperative reasons of security.”315 The Court thus 
rejected assigned residence used solely as a deterrent.
316
 This result derives 
from the Fourth Geneva Convention and from the Jewish value that a 
father’s sins may not be visited on the son. “The character of the State of 
Israel as a democratic, freedom-seeking and liberty-seeking State implies 
that one may not assign the place of residence of a person unless that 
 
 
 311. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. 
 312. Article 78 provides:  
If the Occupying Power considers it necessary, for imperative reasons of security, to take 
safety measures concerning protected persons, it may, at the most, subject them to assigned 
residence or to internment. Decisions regarding such assigned residence or internment shall 
be made according to a regular procedure to be prescribed by the Occupying Power in 
accordance with the provisions of the present Convention. This procedure shall include the 
right of appeal for the parties concerned. Appeals shall be decided with the least possible 
delay. In the event of the decision being upheld, it shall be subject to periodical review, if 
possible every six months, by a competent body set up by the said Power. Protected persons 
made subject to assigned residence and thus required to leave their homes shall enjoy the full 
benefit of Article 39 of the present Convention. 
Geneva Convention, supra note 191, art. 78. 
 313. Ajuri, slip op. ¶ 21. 
 314. Id. ¶ 22. The Court justified this result, in part, by pointing to the fact that “the Palestinian 
side also regards the two areas as on entity, and the leadership of these two areas is a combined one.” 
Id. Query, whether the Court would reach the same result after Hamas defeated Fatah in Gaza.  
 315. Id. ¶¶ 24–28. 
 316. Id. ¶¶ 24, 27. 
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person himself, by his own deeds, constitutes a danger to the security of 
the State.”317  
With respect to the specific orders of relocation, the Court upheld two 
and reversed one. The deportation of the 34-year-old sister of a terrorist 
responsible for sending suicide bombers to Tel Aviv was upheld based on 
testimony that she had sewn the explosive belts used by the suicide 
bombers.
318
 The deportation of the 38-year-old brother of that same 
terrorist was also upheld based on testimony that he was aware of his 
brother’s activities and on one occasion acted as a lookout when 
explosives were moved.
319
 The Court, however, reversed the order of 
deportation of the 35-year-old brother of a wanted terrorist, finding that 
the mere fact that he was aware that his brother was wanted by Israeli 
security forces and gave him food and clean clothes was insufficient to 
constitute a real danger to the security of the area.
320
  
The Court concluded by emphasizing that no matter what challenges 
Israel faces, it must always act within the framework of the law: “[N]ot 
every effective measure is also a lawful measure. . . . The well-known 
saying that ‘In battle laws are silent’ does not reflect the law as it is, nor as 
it should be.”321 Consistent with its view of the justiciability of national 
security cases, the Court limited the authority of the military commander 
to what it found to be lawful under international and domestic law. 
5. Restrictions on Fuel & Electricity Supply to Gaza 
Israel launched a military operation in Gaza known as “Cast Lead” in 
December 2008 to retaliate for rocket attacks from Gaza. The war resulted 
in massive destruction and caused over one thousand Palestinian casualties 
and thirteen Israeli casualties.
322
 During the 22 day war, the Israeli 
Supreme Court decided two cases, revealing its willingness to hear cases 
in real-time. The two cases, Physicians for Human Rights v. Prime 
 
 
 317. Id. ¶ 24. 
 318. Id. ¶¶ 31–32. She was not criminally prosecuted because, as the Court noted, the evidence 
against her “is privileged and cannot be presented in a criminal trial.” Id. ¶ 32. 
 319. Id. ¶¶ 33–36. 
 320. Id. ¶¶ 37–39. 
 321. Id. ¶ 41. 
 322. Gaza was captured by Israel during the 1967 war. In 1993, pursuant to the Oslo Accord, the 
Palestinian authority took over the administrative governance of Gaza. In 2005, Israel unilaterally 
withdrew from Gaza and evicted the Israeli settlers living in Gaza. Elections in 2006 resulted in Hamas 
assuming power and serious violence erupted between Hamas and Fatah. Ultimately, Gaza was left in 
the complete control of Hamas. Israel continued to control Gaza’s airspace and sea and all borders 
except for the southern border with Egypt. Profile: Gaza Strip, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
middle_east/5122404.stm (last updated Jan. 6, 2009). 
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Minister of Israel, and Gisha Legal Centre for Freedom of Movement v. 
Minister of Defence, were combined and decided together.
323
 The first case 
involved a challenge to delays in evacuating the wounded to hospitals, and 
attacks on ambulances and medical personnel.
324
 The second case involved 
a challenge to reductions in fuel and electricity to the Gaza Strip.
325
  
The petitions for both cases were filed on January 7, 2009, four days 
after Israeli troops entered Gaza. The Supreme Court held hearings on 
January 9 and 15 and rendered its decision before the ceasefire on January 
19.
326
 The government argued that both cases were nonjusticiable, and 
should not be addressed while hostilities are taking place.
327
 Not 
surprisingly, the Court rejected that argument, pointing out that it has 
heard thousands of cases regarding the rights of inhabitants of the 
territories, including the legality of military operations in real-time.
328
 
As to the merits of the first petition, the court noted that while the 
classification of the conflict between Israel and Hamas is complicated, 
both sides agree that Israel’s combat operations are subject to international 
humanitarian law, which requires that medical personnel are protected, the 
wounded are evacuated, and the basic rights of civilians are protected.
329
 
The real dispute became a factual one, requiring the Court to try to 
determine what was actually happening in Gaza during actual conflict 
when the facts and circumstances were changing on a daily basis.
330
 
Ultimately, the Court declined to enter an order, relying instead on 
governmental assurances that humanitarian mechanisms had already been 
enhanced, that a serious effort would be made to improve the evacuation 
and treatment of the wounded, and that a clinic had been established at a 
crossing between Gaza and Israel.
331
 
As to the second petition, the Court denied the claim that Israel had 
unlawfully caused a severe electricity shortage in Gaza. Citing detailed 
reports from the field, the Court found that adequate steps were being 
 
 
 323. HCJ 201/09 Physicians for Human Rights v. Prime Minister of Israel, IsrLR 1 [2009] (Isr.), 
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/09/010/002/n07/09002010.n07.pdf; HCJ 248/09 Gisha 
Legal Centre for Freedom of Movement v. Minister of Defence, IsrLR 1 [2009] (Isr.), available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/09/010/002/n07/09002010.n07.pdf. 
 324. HCJ 201/09 Physicians for Human Rights, IsrLR 1. 
 325. HCJ 248/09 Gisha Legal Centre for Freedom of Movement, IsrLR 1. 
 326. Id. ¶ 4. 
 327. Id. ¶ 7. 
 328. HCJ 201/09 Physicians for Human Rights, IsrLR 1, ¶ 11. 
 329. Id. ¶ 17. 
 330. Id. ¶ 13. 
 331. Id. ¶ 23. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss1/3
  
 
 
 
 
2013] DEFERENCE OR ABDICATION 151 
 
 
 
 
taken to repair damaged electricity lines and to supply fuel so that the local 
electricity station could be operated.
332
 
Yet, while the Court denied the requested relief, it exhorted the IDF to 
make strenuous efforts to discharge the state’s humanitarian obligations:  
As long as Israel controls the transfer of essentials and the supply of 
humanitarian needs to the Gaza Strip, it is bound by the obligations 
enshrined in international humanitarian law, which require it to 
allow the civilian population access, to—inter alia—medical 
facilities, food and water, as well as additional humanitarian items 
that are necessary for the maintenance of civilian life.
333
 
The Supreme Court heard another case involving the supply of fuel and 
electricity to Gaza, but this case preceded Operation Cast Lead. In Jaber 
Al-Bassiouni Ahmed v. Prime Minister, petitioners challenged the decision 
to reduce or limit the supply of fuel and electricity to Gaza.
334
 More 
specifically, petitioners alleged that restricting electricity was causing 
power outages in hospitals and preventing the pumping of clean water to 
the civilian population.
335
 The government justified the restriction of 
electricity by asserting the purpose of preventing the electricity’s use in 
workshops manufacturing rockets.
336
 The parties agreed that international 
law requires combatants to ensure the welfare and basic rights of civilian 
populations.
337
 Thus, the state has humanitarian duties, which include 
allowing the passage of essential humanitarian goods and refraining from 
intentional harm to humanitarian facilities.
338
 What was in dispute is 
whether that humanitarian duty extends to the unrestricted supply of 
electricity.
339
 
The Court determined that the restriction of electricity did not breach 
Israel‘s humanitarian duties. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied 
heavily on the government’s representations that it was carrying out 
weekly assessments that included conversations with the Palestinian 
authorities and international organizations and was carefully monitoring 
whether the restrictions were impacting humanitarian needs and adjusting 
 
 
 332. HCJ 248/09 Gisha Legal Centre for Freedom of Movement, IsrLR 1, ¶ 24. 
 333. Id. ¶ 27. 
 334. HCJ 9132/07 Jaber Al-Bassiouni Ahmed v. Prime Minister [2008] (Isr.) (unpublished), 
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/07/320/091/n25/07091320.n25.pdf. 
 335. Id. ¶ 5. 
 336. Id. ¶ 6. 
 337. Id. ¶ 14. 
 338. Id. ¶¶ 13–15. 
 339. Id. ¶ 15. The state agreed to allow the supply of industrial diesel at the same level as before 
the restrictions. Id. ¶ 17. 
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the supply when necessary.
340
 The Court was persuaded that the rules of 
domestic and international law were being “scrupulously observed.”341 
The Court concluded: 
[T]he Gaza Strip is controlled by a murderous terrorist organization, 
which acts relentlessly to inflict harm on the State of Israel and its 
inhabitants, violating every possible rule of international law in its 
violent acts, which are directed indiscriminately at civilians—men, 
women and children. Despite this, . . . the State of Israel is 
committed to fighting the terrorist organizations within the 
framework of the law and in accordance with the provisions of 
international law, and to refrain from intentional harm to the civilian 
population in the Gaza Strip. In view of all the information 
presented to us with regard to the supply of electricity to the Gaza 
Strip, we are of the opinion that the amount of industrial diesel that 
the State said it intends to supply, as well as the electricity that is 
continually supplied through the power lines from Israel, are 
capable of satisfying the essential humanitarian needs of the Gaza 
Strip at the present.
342
 
The Gaza cases provide another example of the Court denying relief 
seemingly only because the government was involved in constant 
monitoring which itself was likely prompted by the prospect of judicial 
oversight. As the next Part argues, the major accomplishment of the Israeli 
Supreme Court is the effect its rulings have had on the formulation and 
execution of governmental policy. 
IV. WISDOM AND EFFICACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CASES IMPLICATING 
NATIONAL SECURITY 
What is the proper role for the judicial branch in cases challenging 
executive action undertaken to prevent terrorism? The classic argument 
made by the executive branch in both Israel and the United States is that 
the judicial branch lacks the institutional competence to resolve challenges 
to national security policies and that the courts should not second-guess 
decisions made by those charged with protecting the nation. Treating these 
 
 
 340. Id. ¶¶ 18–19. 
 341. Id. ¶ 20. 
 342. Id. ¶ 22. 
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cases as non-justiciable is thought to promote separation of powers and 
reinforce the democratic nature of the political branches of government.
343
 
As Parts II and III demonstrate, the Israeli Supreme Court is far more 
likely than its US counterpart to treat national security cases as justiciable. 
The Israeli Supreme Court’s response to the argument that the judiciary 
lacks institutional competence is simple and straightforward: the military 
has expertise over military matters; the judiciary has expertise over legal 
matters. As to the former, deference is warranted; as to the latter, 
deference is inappropriate.
344
 In contrast, the US Supreme Court has 
historically been more likely to invoke one of the justiciability doctrines to 
deny review. What accounts for this difference? Possible answers include: 
geo-political considerations, which have led the Israeli Supreme Court to 
seek to improve Israel’s credibility in the world community by referencing 
international legal norms;
345
 “Jewish values,” which explicitly play a role 
in Israeli judicial decision-making;
346
 disillusionment with the infallibility 
 
 
 343. See supra text accompanying notes 2–29.  
 344. See supra text accompanying notes 30–51, 107.  
 345. See, e.g., Pnina Lahav, Israel’s Supreme Court, in CONTEMPORARY ISRAEL: DOMESTIC 
POLITICS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND SECURITY CHALLENGES 135, 143–44 (Robert Freedman ed., 2009). 
Lahav points to the fact that the Court’s terrorism decisions are immediately translated into English as 
evidence of the government’s view that the Court’s decisions are “useful in its international relations.” 
Id. at n.47. 
 346. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty provides that human rights can be limited only “by a 
law befitting the values of the State of Israel.” The values include “recognition of the value of the 
human being, the sanctity of human life, and the principle that all persons are free; these rights shall be 
upheld in the spirit of the principles set forth in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of 
Israel.” Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, SH No. 1391, §§ 1(a), 8 (Isr.). The 
Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel includes: a guarantee of liberty, justice and 
peace; social and political equality irrespective of religion, race or sex; freedom of conscience, 
worship, education and culture; and faithfulness to the charter of the United Nations. Declaration of 
the Establishment of the State of Israel, May 14, 1948. Most of the decisions cited in Part III of this 
article make explicit reference to the Jewish values upon which the country was established. See, e.g., 
HCJ 3451/02 Almandi v. Minister of Defense 56(3) IsrSC 30, ¶ 54 [2002] (Isr.); HCJ 3239/02 Marab 
v. IDF Commander in the West Bank slip op. ¶ 20 [July 28, 2002] (Isr.); HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF 
Commander in West Bank [Sept. 3, 2002] slip op. ¶ 24 (Isr.).  
 For a discussion of competing views of the meaning of “Jewish state,” see MENACHEM MAUTNER, 
LAW AND THE CULTURE OF ISRAEL (2011). Mautner describes how Justice Barak finessed the tension 
between “Jewish state” and “democratic state” by interpreting “Jewish state” at a high level of 
abstraction, whereas other jurists, notably Justice Elon, interpreted “Jewish state” as more specifically 
invoking Jewish law. Id. at 50–51. 
 For a discussion of contrasting views as to how Jewish law approaches human rights, see David 
Wermuth, Human Rights in Jewish Law: Contemporary Juristic and Rabbinic Conceptions, 32 U. PA. 
J. INT’L. ECON. L. 1101 (2011). According to Wermuth, some Israeli rabbis continue to cling to a 
xenophobic view reflecting a history of Jewish persecution and refuse to embrace human rights 
protections for non-Jews. Other Israeli rabbis highlight the importance of tolerance in Jewish law, 
which they argue supports modern human rights values. In contrast to the rabbis, the Court is free to 
read “Jewish law through a universal lens.” Wermuth concludes that “Jewish law in the hands of 
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of the defense forces;
347
 and service in the IDF by every young Israeli, 
which brings an immediacy to military issues that may not be as 
pronounced in the United States, which maintains an all-volunteer 
military.
348
 No one explanation likely provides the full answer and it may 
be that no factor is more significant than the sheer forcefulness and 
persuasiveness of Justice Barak’s convictions and personality. 
As to the argument that deferring to the political branches promotes 
and reinforces separation of powers, the Israeli Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held that it is inappropriate to defer to the political branches 
when human rights are at stake.
349
 At times, even the US Supreme Court 
has rejected the argument that democratic legitimacy and separation of 
powers justifies deference to the executive branch in national security 
cases.
350
 The US Supreme Court has acknowledged: “Whatever power the 
United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges 
with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most 
assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties 
are at stake.”351  
Exploring the proper role of the courts in cases of national security is 
far more than a philosophical, jurisprudential exercise. In this author’s 
opinion, the availability of judicial review has an actual effect on 
governmental policy and military practice, and thus plays a major role in 
reining in governmental excesses in times of war. The Israeli Supreme 
Court’s willingness to hear virtually all challenges to military conduct, 
even while conflict is ongoing, has undoubtedly affected both the 
formulation and the execution of policy. 
 
 
modern Israeli rabbis and jurists has moved and continues to move towards the modern, tolerant, and 
universal approach to human rights.” Id. at 1132.  
 347. DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE (2002). “[T]he trauma of the Yom Kippur 
War, in which the myth that the Israeli Defense Forces are infallible was tragically shattered, may well 
have encouraged the Court that blind faith in the decisions of the security establishment could no 
longer be maintained in any sphere.” Id. at 120. 
 348. Israel, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS (Dec. 1988), http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/ 
query/r-6841.html. 
 349. See supra text accompanying note 43. 
 350. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 351. Id. at 536. And in Boumediene, the Court stated:  
Our basic charter cannot be contracted away like this. . . . Abstaining from questions 
involving formal sovereignty and territorial governance is one thing. To hold the political 
branches have the power to switch the Constitution on or off at will is quite another. The 
former position reflects this Court’s recognition that certain matters requiring political 
judgments are best left to the political branches. The latter would permit a striking anomaly in 
our tripartite system of government, leading to a regime in which Congress and the President, 
not this Court, say “what the law is.”  
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)). 
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In discussions about military policy in the occupied territories, the 
question always asked is “will it withstand High Court of Justice 
scrutiny?”352 When military policy is being formulated, policy-makers 
anticipate that it will be challenged in the Supreme Court. As a 
consequence, policy-makers include legal advisors from MAG (Military 
Advocates General) in all operational planning, including tactics and the 
legality of weapons, starting at the early developmental stage. Since 2006, 
a legal advisor has functioned at the commander level. During Operation 
Cast Lead (the 2008 war in Gaza), MAG legal advisors were stationed at 
the headquarters level and the commanders level.
353
 So, perhaps the most 
important way in which the High Court of Justice has had an impact on the 
ground is that it has led to an increasing role of legal advisors in the 
formulation of policy. 
The military legal advisors are also responsible for communicating 
Supreme Court judgments to soldiers on the ground. When the Israeli 
Supreme Court renders a judgment, MAG prepares a report summarizing 
the decision and sends it to all relevant sections of the Army and the 
Ministry of Defence. The report is signed by the Military Advocate 
General himself if the case is particularly important. 
The mere filing of a petition with the Supreme Court itself has an effect 
on actual practice. It starts a process of reconsideration that often results in 
adjustments prior to actual judgment by the Court.
354
 Indeed, even prior to 
filing a petition, many NGOS utilize a pre-petition procedure by sending a 
letter to the Israeli Ministry of the Justice with a copy of the complaint. 
The letter asks the Ministry of Justice to look into the matter or else the 
complaint will be filed in the High Court of Justice. When that happens, 
 
 
 352. Interview with Pnina Sharut-Baruch, retired Colonel and former head of IDF International 
Law Department, in Tel Aviv, Isr. (June 29, 2011). In Hebrew, this is expressed as “Lo Bagitz”? 
Colonel Sharut-Baruch said that when she joined the International Law department, she was handed a 
copy of the Geneva Conventions, which she said was treated as the Bible. See, e.g., ASSAF MEYDANI, 
THE ISRAELI SUPREME COURT AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS REVOLUTION 163 (2011) (“Given that it 
gradually became clear that almost any decision made by the government or the parliament was likely 
to be brought to the HCJ by some dissatisfied group, politicians started to consider the possible 
position of the HCJ in any decision-making process.”); KRETZMER, supra note 347, at 120 (describing 
the “potential inhibitive impact on decision-making within the executive”); id. at 191 (describing 
government lawyers using the threat of judicial review “as a way of restraining the military 
authorities”). 
 353. Id. In contrast, during the first Lebanon War, no one asked the lawyers anything in advance. 
That changed in 2000 with the deterioration of conditions in the occupied territories. 
 354. See, e.g., HCJ 7862/04 Abu-Dahar v. IDF Military Commander in Judea and Samaria 59(5) 
PD 368 [2005] (Isr.) (involving a challenge to the Military Commander’s decision to cut down trees in 
petitioner’s orchard for security purposes. From the time of the filing of the petition to the time that the 
case was heard, the Military Commander decided to cut down only 60–70% of the trees originally 
destined for destruction.).  
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the Ministry of Justice sends the letter and proposed complaint to MAG 
and again, the question arises, will this withstand High Court scrutiny?
355
 
Even in cases where the High Court of Justice hears and denies the 
petition, the availability of judicial review makes a difference. For 
example, where petitioners challenged the IDF’s failure to protect medical 
personnel and assist in the evacuation of the wounded during the war in 
the Gaza Strip, the Court’s oversight resulted in constant monitoring and 
detailed responses from the government demonstrating that it was meeting 
its humanitarian obligations.
356
 And, where petitioners challenged the 
conditions of confinement during Operation Defensive Wall, where 6,000 
Palestinians were arrested and detained in makeshift camps, the Court held 
hearings over six months, during which time conditions improved 
substantially.
357
 And, in the accompanying case challenging the separation 
fence, several portions of the route were adjusted even before the Court’s 
final judgment.
358
 In all these cases, the Court has denied relief only “after 
ensuring that the petitioner has received (or will receive) some of the 
requested remedy (or all of it).”359 The willingness of the Court to hear a 
case thus prompts remedial action that might not otherwise occur. 
Studies reveal that this has been the Court’s “modus operandi” in 
dealing with governmental action in the occupied territories: 
[T]he Court has often forced the authorities to reconsider planned 
action or to compromise with the petitioner. Sometimes pressure on 
the authorities is the direct result of remarks made by judges during 
a hearing. . . . In other cases issuance of an interim injunction by the 
Court pending a final decision in the case, has allowed time for 
public opinion to force the authorities to reconsider their opinion. 
The authorities frequently back down or compromise before the 
matter reaches court. The system of “settlement in the Court’s 
shadow” has meant that the restraining influence of the Court has 
been far greater than can be gleaned from its actual decisions. In 
fact, when out-of-court settlement is taken into account, the rate of 
actual success of Palestinian petitioners from the Occupied 
 
 
 355. Sharut-Baruch, supra note 352; see also KRETZMER, supra note 347, at 246 n.8. 
 356. HCJ 4764/04 Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in Gaza 58(5) PD 385, ¶ 28 
[2004] (Isr.). 
 357. HCJ 3278/02 The Center for Defense of the Individual v. Commander of the IDF Forces in 
the West Bank [2002] slip op. (Isr.). 
 358. Id. ¶¶ 16–22. 
 359. Davidov & Reichman, supra note 104, at 947 (citation omitted). 
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Territories is higher than the overall success rate of petitioners to 
the Supreme Court.
360
 
Despite the effectiveness of Israel’s Supreme Court in cases pitting 
national security against human rights, there have been problems of non-
compliance. The fact that it took four years to comply with the Court’s 
order to remove the separation fence in Bilin
361
 is the mostone blatant but 
noy the only illustration of non-compliance. In Mayor of Ad-Dhahiriya v. 
IDF Commander, the government was held in contempt for failing to 
comply with a clear directive to remove a concrete barricade that limited 
the movement of local residents.
362
  
Whether or not the Court’s torture decision has had an effect on actual 
practice is a matter of dispute.
363
 When the decision was announced, Ami 
Ayalon, Israel’s security chief, immediately announced that the decision 
would be obeyed.
364
 According to the Public Committee against Torture in 
Israel, Mr. Ayalon’s pledge evaporated after the outbreak of the second 
Intifada. According to that NGO, “the large number of complaints 
received since the ruling show that the GSS interrogators have continued 
to use torture in the interrogation rooms. They also continue to enjoy 
complete immunity thanks to a system that abuses and extends the 
loopholes created by the HJC ruling.”365 The loophole referred to is the 
 
 
 360. KRETZMER, supra note 347, at 189–90 (citing M. NEGBI, JUSTICE UNDER OCCUPATION: THE 
ISRAELI SUPREME COURT VERSUS THE MILITARY ADMINISTRATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 
(1981); Dotan, Judicial Rhetoric, Government Lawyers and Human Rights: The Case of the Israeli 
High Court of Justice during the Intifada, 33 LAW & SOC. REV. 319 (1999)). 
 361. See supra text accompanying notes 292–93. 
 362. HCJ 1748/06 Mayor of Ad-Dhahiriya v. IDF Commander 3 PD 1, 163 [2006]. There have 
apparently been very few contempt cases, although threats of contempt are more commonplace. See 
Sharut-Baruch, supra note 352. 
 363. Indeed, the very question of whether the Court has served as the protector of human rights is 
itself subject to fierce debate. Some argue that the Court has legitimized governmental policy while 
purporting to uphold human rights. See, e.g., Nimer Sultany, The Legacy of Justice Aharon Barak: A 
Critical Review, 48 HARVARD INT’L L.J. ONLINE 83 (2007); KRETZMER, supra note 347, at 3 (The 
exercise of judicial review of governmental action in the Occupied Territories has served two 
purposes: “that of imprinting governmental action with the stamp of legitimacy, and that of checking 
the political branches of government.”). One example is the litigation surrounding the separation fence. 
Although the Court granted relief in the form of requiring a re-routing of various portions of the fence, 
it nevertheless upheld the legality of the wall. See HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Gov’t 
of Israel 58(5) PD 807 [2004] (Isr.). Others see the Court, particularly under the leadership of Justice 
Barak, as the major guarantor of civil rights. See, e.g., Pnina Lahav, Israel’s Supreme Court, supra 
note 345, at 1325. 
 364. Joseph Lelyveld, Interrogating Ourselves, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 12, 2005), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/12/magazine/12TORTURE.html?pagewanted=all. 
 365. PCATI, DECEMBER 2009 PERIODIC REPORT, ACCOUNTABILITY DENIED: THE ABSENCE OF 
INVESTIGATION AND PUNISHMENT OF TORTURE IN ISRAEL 8–9 (2009), available at http://www.stop 
torture.org.il/files/Accountability_Denied_Eng.pdf. 
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fact that although the Court held that domestic and international law 
prohibit torture without exceptions, it also recognized the possibility of 
asserting the necessity defense after the fact. Thus the report concludes 
that the decision “paved the way for the approval of torture” through the 
back door.
366
  
Other NGOs disagree. B’Tselem, an Israeli human rights organization, 
reports a dramatic reduction in the number of Palestinians subjected to 
what is now called “special methods” of interrogation.367 The Executive 
Director of B’Tselem said there was “a new restraint in Israel since the 
Supreme Court’s ruling.”368 The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring 
group agrees. A spokesperson of that organization said that while twenty 
Palestinians died in Israeli prisons during the first Intifada, there were no 
such deaths in the second Intifada.
369
 
Whichever side is right, it seems clear that a system that encompasses 
judicial review of practices alleged to violate human rights is far more 
likely to stem abuses by the political branches. In Israel, security forces 
and military commanders know that their every action can and likely will 
be scrutinized by the Israeli Supreme Court. This stands in sharp contrast 
to the United States where the greater likelihood is that cases regarding 
practices such as torture and targeted killing will never be heard by the 
Supreme Court. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A study of the Supreme Courts of Israel and the United States offers a 
fascinating contrast when it comes to how they handle “war on terrorism” 
cases. The Israeli High Court of Justice will permit an NGO to bring a 
case, will hear the case in real time while the conflict is ongoing, and will 
consider it justiciable even if it raises a sensitive issue of national security. 
In the United States, comparable cases are often treated as non-justiciable, 
based on doctrines including standing, the political question doctrine, and 
the state secrets privilege.  
The experience in Israel, while far from perfect, demonstrates that the 
judicial branch has the institutional capability to resolve challenges to 
national security policies, and that the availability of judicial review has an 
 
 
 366. Id. at 17. 
 367. Joseph Lelyveld, supra note 364. 
 368. Id. 
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actual effect on governmental policy and military practice and thus plays a 
major role in reining in governmental excesses in times of war.  
The norm that has developed in Israel in even the most sensitive cases 
is that there is always a legal framework for the courts to use. This has 
reinforced the rule of law as a bedrock principle in Israeli society, which is 
due in large measure to the phenomenon of legal oversight by the Israeli 
Supreme Court. In the aftermath of 9/11, when the US executive branch 
asserted unbridled power and argued that the courts had no role to play, 
the Israeli approach—an approach that says that there is always a legal 
framework to apply—might have played a moderating role. In this 
author’s opinion, failing to treat these cases as justiciable amounts to an 
abdication of the judicial role, as envisioned by Marbury v. Madison.
370
 
 
 
 370. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
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